

FIELD EXPERIMENTAL UNIT

SIAT Roll 40

FIELD EXPERIMENTAL UNIT

START Roll 40



FIELD EXPERIMENTAL UNIT

START Roll 40

100-100000

6004/28/1964

To: Cdr. [unclear]

Prepared in accordance  
with your suggestion.

CABase

1

Office of the Secretariat

(0230)

OSS Form 4001

## OSS SECRETARIAT - ROUTE SLIP

TO		Date
Name	Initials	
D. C. Doering, Jr.		
C. A. Bane		
J. D. Donovan		
D. C. Lee		
D. S. Platt		
P. F. Pugliese		
E. J. Putzella, Jr.		
A. W. Sulloway		
R. Thurn		
Files		

(23695)

**SECRET**

TO: LT. BURT

Will you please tell  
Colonel Buxton that I think the  
Committee he has appointed is  
excellent, and will you please  
submit an appropriate order for  
his approval.

OCD

Office of the Executive Officer

(30444)



(11)

Date 12 Nov 44

Col. Dunning

Col. Buxton wants your  
opinion on the constitution  
of the committee as  
noted by him.

RT

*Samuel*

Office of the Executive Officer

(30447)

*to be kept confidential*  
**SECRET**

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

## INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Colonel Buxton

FROM: Lt. Colonel Doering,

SUBJECT:

DATE: 8 April 1944

General Donovan asked that a re-examination be made of the handling of peach material, with special reference to the principal order which, with certain exceptions, requires that it be seen by the Theater Officer.

The General would like to have on the committee, Colonel Richards, Margaret Griggs, and such other members including the Chairman, as you select.

You will, however, note from the memorandum attached that the General decided that all Eifler material should go direct to and through you.

*Chairman Col. Vandenberg**Gen. Magruder's representative  
Col. B. B. B. representative  
Col. Richards**Margaret Griggs  
Howard*

Ycc - CC: Major Lee  
Lt. Putnell

*o. o. l. w. f***SECRET**

①  
Col. Boring.  
This case has  
not been covered.

Director's Office

(S)

**SECRET**

Mr. Scribner

27 March 1946

Colonel Burton

Communications of Hq. AFSA.

1. We recently discussed this question and agree that a large part of the communications of the Hq. AFSA are of such a character that no harm would result if they were put through the Registry in regular course and shown to the Theater Officer concerned. A small percentage of these messages are, of course, unusually secret and should be restricted to the minimum possible number of people. We also agreed that it would be desirable not to create a general exception of Hq. AFSA communications from the normal routing and processing, but limit any special treatment to those few highly secret matters.

2. Accordingly, I am cabling Hq. AFSA to send all his messages, both pouch and cable, to me personally for the time being. I will make the initial review of this material and, according to its character, will either send it to the Registry or send it directly to the Officer concerned. Similarly, outgoing material should be referred to me for clearance before it is dispatched. I will determine whether outgoing cables should properly be initialed by the Theater Officer and whether copies of outgoing pouch material should be filed in the Registry after routing through the Theater Officer. I will also clear interoffice communications for regular or special processing.

3. After a few weeks experience with the material, it may be possible then to draw up definite rules for its handling.

CG's: ✓ General Donovan  
Mrs. Griggs  
Captain France

G. Edward Burton  
Assistant Director

DOL/AS

OK  
W.D.  
H.T.**SECRET**



OS 5 Form #191

Date: 25 March

To: COLONEL RIXTON

It does not seem to me that the Registry was very much at fault.

I am convinced that it is absolutely essential for the Registry to log and record incoming documents. This is done in all message centers or registries of all other agencies.

On the issue of Top Secret Control alone, some such system was to be followed.



Executive Officer

(30449)

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*Field Supervisor of the 1st 21st*

# Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Mr. Weston Howland  
 FROM : Margaret T. Griggs, Registrar  
 SUBJECT:

DATE: March 28, 1944  
*1st 21st*

Lt. Clark directed to our attention a memorandum from Colonel Carl F. Eifler, addressed to you, with regard to Registry procedure for handling official mail of members of OSS as applied to a pouch letter addressed to him from Lt. Colonel L. W. Richmond (Registry #13902-217). I have investigated the treatment accorded this pouch letter from the time of its arrival in OSS to its delivery to Colonel Eifler and I find that the rules for handling official pouch mail were observed. The story of this letter is as follows.

1. On March 18, the Far East Theater Officer delivered to the Registry (which serves SSO, SI and X-2) a sealed envelope addressed to Colonel Eifler. This envelope was opened by Mrs. Dorothy King who is delegated to handle all incoming pouch mail for OSS.

2. Within the outer envelope she found a sealed official war department envelope addressed to Colonel Carl F. Eifler marked in ink "Personal and Confidential". Since pouch facilities are granted to OSS on the basis that no personal letters will be transmitted by pouch, it is our assumption that the word "personal" on the outside of an OSS pouch envelope indicates that, while the subject matter within the envelope may be of a so-called "unaccessioned" nature, it is never personal in the sense that it is for the exclusive use of the addressee outside the conduct of his work for the organization. Therefore, the inner sealed envelope was opened by Mrs. King; the contents recorded and indexed under a file number assigned in accordance with the security regulations governing our filing system. A secret routing sheet was placed on this letter and the letter was directed to the Far East Theater Officer for his perusal before its delivery to Colonel Eifler (see General Order No. 9, Supplement No. 31).

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Mr. Weston Howland

- 2 -

March 22, 1944

3. Also enclosed within the original outer envelope, loose, were some plans and a book of photographs and sketches which were clearly marked "For Stanley Lovell, Research and Development". Since the Registry is not held responsible for, and does not process, index, or file any of the mail of this branch, this material was forwarded immediately to Major Lovell's office in two sealed envelopes under courier number B-6636. The courier receipt was signed in Major Lovell's office at 12:40 on March 18.

4. When the letter to Colonel Eifler was returned to the Registry from the Far East Theater Office on March 18, it was logged in by the Registry and forwarded by Registry messenger to Colonel Eifler's office, Room 2116, Que Building.

5. Although we find no break in security in the treatment of this particular pouch envelope we do feel that the Registry was at fault in failing to note on the routing sheet covering Colonel Eifler's letter that the remainder of the contents of the envelope had been safely forwarded to its destination. Since this was an oversight that has caused Colonel Eifler great concern the Registry offers Colonel Eifler sincere apologies for an omission in service to him.

In connection with the security aspect of the system by which Colonel Eifler's letter was processed, I want to take the opportunity to reaffirm our belief that security in handling secret documents, of which there are many thousands in the process of continual flow throughout an organization of this size and nature, is consistently maintained only when all papers are processed in an orderly and uniform fashion. The machinery provided to log, check, route, and index such papers moreover takes into account the fact that final responsibility for OSS operations rests with the organization, not the individual. Our records are designed to insure not only physical protection for OSS papers but also their continuing availability to authorized personnel.

*Howard T. Hagg*  
H. T. H.

CONFIDENTIAL

**SECRET****OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES****INTEROFFICE MEMO**

**TO:** General Donovan  
**FROM:** Lt. Colonel Deering  
**SUBJECT:** Eifler Mission

**DATE:** 23 March 1944

I have read Mr. Scribner's memorandum of 11 March to Special Funds Branch in regard to the Eifler Mission. I would like to call your attention to two points:

1. A statement is made that neither Colonel Eifler nor his personnel will be under the jurisdiction of the Strategic Services Officers in the theater to which they are assigned. It seems to me that for the purpose of administrative control while in the theater, the Strategic Services Officer should have jurisdiction over this personnel. There may, and probably will be, disputes as to whether certain undertakings which Colonel Eifler desires to carry out will contravene plans and undertakings already arrived at by the Strategic Services Officer with the staff of the Theater Commander. I wonder if you intended to make the arrangement so stating that no Strategic Services Officer has any authority whatsoever over Colonel Eifler or any of his personnel.

2. Mr. Scribner's memorandum states that communication between Colonel Eifler and his personnel, either by cable or pouch, shall not be subject to inspection by the theater officer. Copies of cables will, of course, automatically go to the Director's Office, but unless affirmative procedure is set up, copies of pouch communications will be seen by the Director only at the pleasure of the person in Washington to whom it is addressed, or by whom it is sent from Washington to the field. Do you wish these pouch communications to be routed through someone in the Director's Office; i.e., either yourself, Colonel Buxton, myself, Major Lee or Ensign Putzell.

*Rel. 7  
Eifler  
Mention  
Hall  
Ans. to  
Buxton  
7. compare  
then*

*O. C. Deering*

**SECRET**





OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

SECRET

11 March 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO: Special Funds Branch  
ATTENTION: Mr. Douglas Dimond  
FROM: J. M. Scribner  
SUBJECT: Rifler Mission

In accordance with Memorandum of 7 March 1944, entitled "Rifler Mission", it is provided on Page 3 that \$100,000 will be appropriated for the purposes of this mission.

It is my understanding that Colonel Rifler has been receiving expenses at the rate of \$300 per month. Assistant  
The Director wishes these payments to be continued, but beginning 15 March 1944 these payments should be charged to the \$100,000 special fund set up for the Rifler Mission.

  
J. M. Scribner,  
Deputy Director, SSC.

SECRET

7 March 1944

REFLECTOR MISSION

Notes on the Above Subject  
Resulting from  
Meeting in this Office this Morning  
at which were present

**SECRET**

Colonel Eifler  
Lt. Col. Bigelow  
Mr. Scribner

As a result of conversation between General Donovan, Colonel Buxton, Colonel Eifler, and myself, held in General Donovan's office last week, Colonel Eifler is assuming command of a special mission which may be known as the "Eifler Unit." Colonel Eifler is to work directly under the command of General Donovan's office and/or the Deputy Director, SEO. His mission will involve:

- (1) The continued demonstration and training in the field in the use of all special OSS toys and devices by means of personnel selected by Colonel Eifler, especially trained in cooperation with the gadgets and assigned to respective theaters.
- (2) The carrying out of special missions with which he may be directly charged as the special representative of the Director of OSS.
- (3) The direction of the Unit will stem directly from Washington to Colonel Eifler and from him to his men in the field. Neither he nor his personnel will be under the jurisdiction of the Strategic Services Officers in the Theaters to which they are assigned. It is not the intention to establish in any of the Theaters a permanent personnel staff. It may, however, be necessary for Colonel Eifler to leave one or more men in a Theater in order to carry out either of the objectives outlined in numbered paragraphs 1 or 2 above.
- (4) Colonel Eifler is instructed to maintain appropriate relationships with the Strategic Services Officers and Chiefs of OSS Missions and their personnel in the field.
- (5) In addition to the foregoing, General Donovan wishes Colonel Eifler to acquaint the various Army commanders with the special OSS toys and devices and make the same available to them in the event they wish to be supplied. Obviously, the amount to be supplied and other details will have to be worked out at the time.

In general, the plan for the implementation of the foregoing is as follows:

(35412)

**SECRET****SECRET**

**SECRET**

- 2 -

**SECRET**

a. Colonel Eifler will procure and transfer to Washington personnel presently estimated to be approximately 12 for special schooling in the techniques necessary to carry out their function. This personnel will be charged against SO T/O. The slots needed to take care of Colonel Eifler's personnel not now within OSS will be made available to SO from the special reserve pool available in the Director's Office.

b. Colonel Eifler will leave for London at as early a date as is possible to acquaint ETO with his mission as above described. From there he will proceed to CBI to complete the arrangements necessary for the turning over of his former organization to his successor, Colonel Goughlin. He will then return to London, possibly by way of Cairo and Algiers for the purpose of acquainting the Strategic Services Officers there with respect to his mission.

Colonel Eifler contemplates that Lt. Colonel Richmond of the Burma Army and Captain Gurn, now in IOL, will return to England with him and will be attached to his Unit, which action has been approved by General Donovan.

Colonel Eifler will spend most of his time in the field, moving from Theater to Theater, personally implementing the foregoing.

It has been proposed by Mr. Stanley Lovell that there be attached to Colonel Eifler's Unit specially trained scientific personnel, acquainted with the field of electronics. This subject was discussed by Messrs. Lovell and Eifler and Mr. Chubbuck of OSRD at a meeting in Mr. Scribner's office 6 March. These individuals will be supplied by OSRD in uniform, not chargeable against OSS T/O, but on loan from OSRD.

Colonel Eifler, prior to his departure, will arrange, in conjunction with Captain Allison, Mr. Lovell and Colonel Robinson, for the training program to be given to his men during his absence and for their housing and general schooling facilities. Captain Allison will follow through for Colonel Eifler in this matter during his absence.

The servicing of the "Eifler Unit" and the administrative responsibility in Washington shall be carried out by personnel approved by Colonel Eifler, established in Washington, working directly under the office of the Deputy Director, SSO. (It is presently contemplated that Captain France will undertake this function.)

The movement of Colonel Eifler's personnel between Theaters is specially exempted from the provisions of General Order No. 16, Supplement No. 2, which requires permission from Washington for the movement of personnel between Theaters.

(35412)

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**SECRET**

**SECRET**

The Director has granted permission to Colonel Rifler to move his personnel between Theaters at will.

An appropriate memorandum will be sent from the Director's Office to Special Funds appropriating \$100,000 for purposes of this mission.

Communication between Colonel Rifler and his personnel, either by cable or pouch, shall not be subject to inspection by the Theater Officer as provided in General Order No. 2, Supplement No. 31.

The Director has granted to Colonel Rifler the right to communicate between Washington and the Field by means other than through the Theater Officers.

J. M. Juchacz  
Deputy Director, WFO

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

(35412)

SECRET

7 March 1946

RIFLER MISSION

Notes on the Above Subject  
Resulting from  
Meeting in this Office this Morning  
at which were present:

Colonel Rifler  
Lt. Col. Mighel  
Mr. Scribner

As a result of conversation between General Donovan, Colonel Dutton, Colonel Rifler, and myself, held in General Donovan's office last week, Colonel Rifler is assuming command of a special mission which may be known as the "Rifler Unit." Colonel Rifler is to work directly under the command of General Donovan's office and/or the Deputy Director, SSO. His mission will involve:

(1) The continued demonstration and training in the field in the use of all special OSS toys and devices by means of personnel selected by Colonel Rifler, especially trained in connection with the gadgets and assigned to respective theaters.

(2) The carrying out of special missions with which he may be directly charged by the special representative of the Director of OSS.

(3) The direction of the Unit will stem directly from Washington to Colonel Rifler and from him to his men in the field. Neither he nor his personnel will be under the jurisdiction of the Strategic Services Officers in the theaters to which they are assigned. It is not the intention to establish in any of the theaters a permanent personnel staff. It may, however, be necessary for Colonel Rifler to leave one or more men in a theater in order to carry out either of the objectives outlined in numbered paragraphs 1 and 2 above.

(4) Colonel Rifler is instructed to maintain appropriate relationships with the Strategic Services Officers and Chiefs of OSS Missions and their personnel in the field.

(5) In addition to the foregoing, General Donovan wishes Colonel Rifler to acquaint the various Army commanders with the special OSS toys and devices and make the same available to them in the event they wish to be supplied. Obviously, the requests to be supplied and other details will have to be worked out at the time.

In general, the plan for the implementation of the foregoing is as follows:

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- 2 -

a. Colonel Kifler will procure and transfer to Washington personnel presently estimated to be approximately 18 for special schooling in the techniques necessary to carry out their functions. This personnel will be charged against SO T/O. The view needed to take care of Colonel Kifler's personnel not now within GNS will be made available to SO from the special reserve pool available in the Director's Office.

b. Colonel Kifler will leave for London at as early a date as is possible to acquaint KFO with his mission as above described. From there he will proceed to GNS to complete the arrangements necessary for the turning over of his former organization to his successor, Colonel Coughlin. He will then return to London, possibly by way of Cairo and Algiers for purposes of acquainting the Strategic Services Officers there with respect to his mission.

Colonel Kifler contemplates that Lt. Colonel Richmond of the Burma Army and Captain Gurl, now in MLI, will return to England with him and will be attached to his Unit, which action has been approved by General Donovan.

Colonel Kifler will spend most of his time in the field, moving from Theater to Theater, personally implementing the foregoing.

It has been proposed by Mr. Stanley Lovell that there be attached to Colonel Kifler's Unit specially trained scientific personnel, acquainted with the field of electronics. This subject was discussed by Messrs. Lovell and Scribner and Mr. Chadburn of OSD at a meeting in Mr. Scribner's office 8 March. These individuals will be supplied by OSD in uniform, not chargeable against SO T/O, but on loan from OSD.

Colonel Kifler, prior to his departure, will arrange, in conjunction with Captain Allison, Mr. Lovell and Colonel Robinson, for the training program to be given to his men during his absence and for their housing and general schooling facilities. Captain Allison will follow through for Colonel Kifler in this matter during his absence.

The servicing of the "Kifler Unit" and the administrative responsibility in Washington shall be carried out by personnel approved by Colonel Kifler, established in Washington, working directly under the office of the Deputy Director, SSO. (It is presently contemplated that Captain France will undertake this function.)

The movement of Colonel Kifler's personnel between Theaters is specially exempted from the provisions of General Order No. 16, Supplement No. 2, which requires permission from Washington for the movement of personnel between Theaters.

The Director has granted permission to Colonel Kifler to move his personnel between Theaters.

SECRET

-3-

An appropriate memorandum will be sent from the Director's Office to Special Funds appropriating \$100,000 for purposes of this mission.

Communication between Colonel Rifler and his personnel, either by cable or pouch, shall not be subject to inspection by the Theater Officer as provided in General Order No. 9, Supplement No. 51.

The Director has granted to Colonel Rifler the right to communicate between Washington and the field by means other than through the Theater Officers.

J. M. Mariboe  
Deputy Director, SMC

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9 March 1946

## MEMORANDUM

HMA MEM 14 APR 9 37

TO: Colonel David K. M. Bruce  
 Colonel Edward J. F. Glavin  
 Lt. Colonel John E. Toulmin  
 Lt. Colonel Richard P. Hopper  
 Lt. Colonel John G. Doughlin  
 Mr. Lanning Macfarland

FROM: J. M. Foran

Attached you will find an interoffice memorandum which is self-explanatory. This paper has been officially approved by General Donovan and he has authorized its dispatch accompanied by this letter to you.

To give you a little more of the general thinking than is contained in the attached, the General feels it is highly desirable for several reasons to establish Colonel Rifier in the capacity described in the enclosed.

One is that he is convinced Washington has not taken all the necessary steps to acquaint our forces in the field with the use of all the special toys and devices which are available to us, and further that the continued exposition of these gadgets plus continued training in their use by experienced, trained men will result in their utilization in the field to the good of all concerned. For instance, there has recently been developed by Research and Development a gadget known as "The Mule". The potentialities of the use of this device are enormous but we are convinced that without the energy and knowledge which may be developed through personnel especially trained in the techniques of its use the result may not be satisfactory nor its use so widely spread. In all of this work, Colonel Rifier is cooperating closely with the Chief of the Research and Development Branch with respect to the usage of the various devices, and Colonel Rifier's undertaking is a general OSS mission.

Although his activities are directly supervised by the Deputy Director, ESO, this arrangement is established for purposes of administration, and it is not intended to mean that his functions and relationships are in any way confined to the various branches within ESO.

Obviously, the arrangement contemplated in the attached memorandum will or will not work smoothly, dependent upon the relationship and degree of cooperation which is developed between you and

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SECRET

- 2 -

Colonel Rifler. This the Director believes to be a problem in human relationships, and he prefers to establish the unit as is outlined in the attached, and requests of both you and Colonel Rifler complete cooperation with respect to each other.

As you will see from the attached, Colonel Rifler may be requested directly from Washington to undertake particular special operations. In the event he is, he will be advised by General Donovan's office directly, and owing to the nature of certain of the operations which may develop, it may be the General's wish that he proceed with their implementation completely on his own initiative. Obviously, these undertakings may not be engaged in without Theater (Commander) approval, but the manner in which this is to be obtained, the method of execution, and the security of the operations are left completely to Colonel Rifler's discretion as he may be instructed by the Director's Office at the time he is directed to undertake the mission. It is appreciated here that this arrangement raises a delicate problem in relationships, but General Donovan has requested me to advise you that he is completely conscious of this problem and that he expects it to be made to work by you and Colonel Rifler together.

It must certainly be not the Director's intention to send Colonel Rifler into the Theater under a mandate which will result in his getting thoroughly into your hair, and Colonel Rifler realizes the delicacy of his position in this matter.

I am instructed by the Director to advise you that you are to communicate with his office or this office directly, in the event, after Colonel Rifler has arrived in your Theater and you have had an opportunity to discuss his mission together in principle with an open mind, there are reasons of fact which in your judgment will make his mission, as outlined, operationally impossible.

I will add that the Director considers Rifler's mission one of highest priority and importance, and that the possibility of difficulty is thoroughly realized here, but I am instructed to advise you that the Rifler mission "must be made to work."

J. M. Scrillmer  
Deputy Director, JCS

Attachment

P. S. General Donovan has seen and approved this letter.

J.M.S.

SECRET

FOR INFO ONLY

FROM

*My Sign*

SECRET

ROUTING AND REVIEW SHEET

Acquisition No. *31226.141*Order No. *88000100180001-4*

No.	Room No.	Date		Officer's Initials	Comments
		Rec'd	For'd		
1				<i>clb</i>	
2					
3					
4					<i>Colonel Dayton has seen this perhaps it should go to Hamilton's file</i>
5					
6					
7					
8					
9					
10					

Each comment should be numbered to correspond with number in No column.

A line should be drawn across sheet under each comment.

Officer Designations should be used in For column.

Each Officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing.

Action desired or action taken should be indicated in Comments column.

Routing sheet should always be returned to Registry.

For Officer Designations see separate sheet.

(20440)

SECRET

**SECRET****OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

WASHINGTON, D. C.

1 January 1946

**MEMORANDUM**

**TO:** Colonel G. Edward Buxton

**FROM:** Edward L. Bigelow

**SUBJECT:** Pay of Agents for Field Experimental Unit

1. This morning you requested me to look into a request by Colonel Eifler that certain agents recruited by him be paid \$3,600 per annum during training and \$6,000 per annum when on active duty behind the lines.
2. I discussed the matter with Colonel Ream of Special Funds, and he states that there is a ceiling established for military personnel to the effect that regular military pay may be supplemented for service behind enemy lines up to a maximum from both sources of \$5,000. No ceiling has been established for civilian agents. He further stated that many civilians were being paid less than \$5,000, others getting about \$5,000, and occasional cases where up to \$6,000 was being paid.
3. When Colonel Eifler was last here, General Donovan inquired as to his plans for paying agents, and Eifler stated that he proposed to pay an average of approximately \$5,000.
4. He now requests permission to take on six agents, pay them \$3,600 during training for service behind the lines. He requests permission to pay three of these men \$6,000, the other three less, the average to be about \$5,000, for service behind the enemy lines.
5. Colonel Eifler has sent by air detailed memoranda covering each individual, showing his former occupation, earning power, etc. This material has not as yet been received. However, Colonel Eifler wishes to be called on the telephone this afternoon and given approval for these arrangements because he is hiring them as of January 1st and several of the men are leaving their present employment as of today. Under these circumstances, the Colonel is fearful lest, being unable to make a definite commitment with these individuals, they may withdraw and many months' effort will thereby be wasted.

*Edward L. Bigelow*  
Edward L. Bigelow  
Deputy Director-SSO

**SECRET**

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

FIELD EXPERIMENTAL UNIT

4 May 1945

TO: Mr. Charles S. Cheston

FROM: Field Experimental Unit

1. In accordance with your directive, I have contacted Col. Eifler and have advised him that:

a. Authority is granted to proceed with construction of two additional training camps on Catalina Island.

b. He is not to proceed with further recruitment of prospective agent personnel other than those to be accommodated at the two additional camps.

c. That he is to remain on the West Coast until advised by the General's office to return to Washington.

2. Colonel Eifler desired that Colonel Connelly be advised as to authority to proceed with construction of additional camps. I have, therefore, prepared the attached TWI for your signature.

*Floyd R. Frazee*  
 FLOYD R. FRAZEE  
 Major, Infantry  
 Executive Officer  
 FBI

APPROVED:

*Edward L. Bigelow*  
 EDWARD L. BIGELOW  
 Deputy Director, SSO

Mr. McKugh  
Secretariat

*19 1230*  
*Should be placed in that*  
**CONFIDENTIAL**  
*W. T. L. L. L. L.*  
9 April 1948  
*W. T. L. L. L.*

1. On 27 March 1948 you sent to the Board of Review, with a carbon copy to the Director, a memorandum concerning additional leases with the Catalina Island Company.

2. For your information General Donovan has initialed his approval on the carbon copy which was sent to him.

Alvan W. Dullaway  
Chief, Secretariat

cc: Board of Review  
J. Schoenir  
Lt. Col. Johnson

AWS:mr

**CONFIDENTIAL**



OSS Form 4001  
(Rev. 7/27/48)

OSS SECRETARIAT - ROUTE SLIP

TO	NAME	INITIALS
	H. C. Roeland, Jr.	
	J. J. Higgins	
	H. J. Pettelt, Jr.	P
	H. Thum	
	D. G. Lee	
	J. W. Archibald	
	M. R. Kestack	
	M. W. Wier	
	F. F. Phillips	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	A. W. Solloway	
	J. R. Donovan	
	A. W. Ameth, Jr.	
	A. L. Dert	
	M. H. Hamilton	
	L. W. Umston	
	C. S. McGilland	
	L. L. McDowell	
	J. R. Schaefer, Jr.	
	Secretariat Files	
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Director's Files	
	D. G. C. Files	

Pls notify McHugh  
+ Bd / Review that  
WHD has approved  
this —

(23095)

**MEMORANDUM**

17 March 1944

TO: Board of Review

FROM: Chief, Procurement & Supply Branch

SUBJECT: Additional Leases with Catalina Island Company

1. This office has been informed by Mr. John R. Schenck, Jr., Office of the General Counsel, that General Donovan has made tentative arrangements with the Catalina Island Company for the leasing of two additional parcels of land known as (1) Isthmus, and (2) Emerald Bay & Johnson's Landing.

2. It is the further understanding of this office that it is the desire of General Donovan to have a letter forwarded to the Santa Catalina Island Company confirming the leasing of the aforementioned property as of March 15, 1944 on the following basis:

	Rental	Rental
	PER ANNUM	PER MONTH
Isthmus	\$15,000	\$1,250.00
Emerald Bay & Johnson's Landing	1,500	125.00

3. Pursuant to Administrative Memorandum dated 10 June 1944, this matter is referred to your office for approval and review.

Mr. I. Mallick

**CONFIDENTIAL**

JK/jan

cc J. Schenck  
cc Director  
cc Johnson  
cc Mallick

OCS, San Francisco Office

**SECRET**Mr. Charles S. Chaston,  
Assistant Director

Colonel H. P. Gurneely

9 March 1946

Leasing of Johnson's Cove.

You will recall that we were instructed to protect the Rifler activity by making a deal for Johnson's Cove, due to the fact that the Catalina Island Company were considering renting it to a Naval activity and if that had happened, it would have jeopardized security. Last week, Major Head and I discussed the rent with the Catalina Island people, and when they stated the rental would be \$354.00 a month, I objected very strenuously. I based my contention on the fact that the rent was considerably higher than we were paying at other places, and they countered with the argument that the Cove was very valuable. Apparently the protest, however, bore fruit, as Mr. Slough, the General Manager, called back in a little while to say that they would do their best to make it satisfactory. Today, Major Head reports that they have finally agreed to rent it to us for \$180.00 a month -- and even that is plenty high but it is some satisfaction to know that we effected a considerable saving. I knew you would be interested in hearing about this.

H. P. GURNEELY  
Colonel, FA  
Chief, Pacific Coast Area

cc: The Director, OCS,  
Washington, D. C.

**SECRET**

OSS Form 104ud

DATE 22 Feb 45

TO:

Mrs. O'Donnell

13, 9314

The attached memo  
from Col. Robinson  
belongs in your file  
on the Egler group  
and not in ours.

FROM:

R.B.

(32816)

EXT.

**SECRET**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
 Schools and Training Branch  
 2324 F Street, N.W.  
 Washington, D.C.

8 February 1945

**SUBJECT:** Security of Students of Eifler Groups at WTTG  
**TO:** Lt. Col. O. O. Doering, Jr., Executive Officer

1. Lt. Col. Donald H. Gregory has sent me a copy of his letter to you dated 5 February 1945, on the subject of the security of the students belonging to Colonel Eifler's two groups who are now in training on Catalina Island.
2. The situation briefly is this: There are two of these groups for training, one group consisting of three students who are located at the camp at Howland's Landing, and a group of four students who are just commencing training at a camp located at Fourth of July Cove. The latter group has been approved by OSS Security Office and constitutes no problem. The first group, however, contains one individual who has been rejected by the Security Office whereas the other two students have been approved. From a training standpoint, it is extremely difficult to provide the subject matter which Colonel Eifler wants us to teach to these students without using secret material. In the case of the group containing the non-approved student, we cannot use secret material unless its use is approved by the Director, in this instance.
3. Lt. Col. Allen, our Training Executive on the west coast, talked to me about this matter by telephone yesterday and has asked for instructions in writing. As the matter now stands, he is faced with the problem of giving one group a complete course including secret material, while the other group cannot be given much except fieldcraft, weapons, physical training, and other non-classified subjects. Since we have available only a very small staff of instructors to train these units, it is essential that the schedule be integrated so that we can utilize these instructors to the greatest possible advantage. The whole plan of training for the two units was based upon our ability to do this. You can readily see, therefore, that Lt. Col. Allen has a real problem on his hands.
4. It is requested that a decision by the Director be given us to either (a) remove the security disapproved student from training and from the island entirely, or (b) waive the security disapproval so that all students can be given the instruction which Colonel Eifler has requested.

*H. L. Robinson*  
 H. L. ROBINSON  
 Colonel, FA  
 Chief, Schools and Training

cc: Lt. Col. Allen

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13, 733 G  
Final Experimental

8 February 1965

## Security of Students of Rifler Groups at WOTU

Lt. Col. O. C. Denning, Jr., Executive Officer

1. Lt. Col. Donald M. Gregory has sent me a copy of his letter to you dated 5 February 1965, on the subject of the security of the students belonging to Colonel Rifler's two groups who are now in training on Catalina Island.

2. The situation briefly is this: There are two of these groups for training, one group consisting of three students who are located at the camp at Howland's Landing, and a group of four students who are now commencing training at a camp located at Fourth of July Cove. The latter group has been approved by the Security Office and constitutes no problem. The first group, however, contains one individual who has been rejected by the Security Office whereas the other two students have been approved. From a training standpoint, it is extremely difficult to provide the subject matter which Colonel Rifler wants us to teach to these students without using secret material. In the case of the group containing the non-approved student, we cannot use secret material unless its use is approved by the Director in this instance.

3. Lt. Col. Allen, our Training Executive on the west coast, talked to me about this matter by telephone yesterday and has asked for instructions in writing. As the matter now stands, he is faced with the problem of giving one group a complete course including secret material, while the other group cannot be given much except fieldcraft, weapons, physical training, and other non-classified subjects. Since we have available only a very small staff of instructors to train these units, it is essential that the schedule be integrated so that we can utilize these instructors to the greatest possible advantage. The whole plan of training for the two units was based upon our ability to do this. You can readily see, therefore, that Lt. Col. Allen has a real problem on his hands.

4. It is requested that a decision by the Director be given us to either (a) remove the security disapproved student from training and from the island entirely, or (b) waive the security disapproval so that all students can be given the instruction which Colonel Rifler has requested.

M. L. MORINSON  
Colonel, FA  
Chief, Schools and Training

cc: Lt. Col. Allen

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**SECRET**

February 20, 1948

**CONFERENCE BETWEEN THE FOLLOWING:**

General Donovan  
Colonel Rifler  
Colonel Bigelow  
Lieutenant Colonel Deering  
Major France  
Lt. Futsel  
Mr. Van Buren

**HELD ON FEBRUARY 20, 1948 AT 10:30 A. M.**

**SUBJECT: SECURITY (KUMSUNG RIE).**

General Donovan stated that he had read the memorandum prepared by Security and Colonel Rifler on the subject, and felt that if the security of the man, Kumsung Rie, was in question, and he felt that it was, that he would rather drop the whole plan. However, he further stated that his mind was open and he would like to hear what Colonel Rifler had to say with regards to his investigation of the subject.

Colonel Rifler re-stated what had been brought out in Lt. Nichols' memorandum, and elucidated on the fact that his investigation was conducted not with the thought in mind of the Korean recruits' loyalty to the United States, but of their hatred of the Japanese, their loyalty to Korea, and their desire to free Korea from the Japanese yoke.

Colonel Rifler further pointed out the intensity of his investigation and that M/Sgt. Sukyeon Chang, a Korean who has been with O.S.S. for almost three years, was in accord with Colonel Rifler and his investigators, that Kumsung Rie had the necessary qualifications to carry out the mission which he was to undertake.

Colonel Rifler further stated that he and Mr. Van Buren had yesterday discussed Kumsung Rie's security, and that he, Colonel Rifler, knew that Mr. Van Buren would be unable in all cases to "security clear" the type recruits that Colonel Rifler desires, as they would be men who have recently come from Korea, and there would be no means by which their security could be checked in the United States.

General Donovan pointed out that there was a possibility that I-2's records might show whether they were or were not agents.

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Colonel Rifler further pointed out that he intended to bring into Field Experimental Unit, as per the General's directive, prisoners of war and make agents of them, and there again, security could not approve those men for overall usage in O.S.S. Further, that it was not contemplated to use these men for overall usage in O.S.S., but as agents for this particular mission.

General Donovan next called on Mr. Van Duren, who stated that he and Colonel Rifler had discussed the security of Kumsung Rio, and that although he felt he could approve the man as an agent, he could not approve him for overall usage in O.S.S.

General Donovan then stated that in view of the facts presented he approved Kumsung Rio for this mission, and that he, General Donovan, could not evade the responsibility placed upon him and did not wish to do so, but accepted this responsibility based on his confidence in Colonel Rifler's judgment and understanding of what he, General Donovan, desired.

Colonel Rifler pointed out that the men in Kumsung Rio's group were receiving training at the present time only in weapons and junglecraft, and that with this training, he could not make agents. General Donovan agreed.

General Donovan pointed out that he desired these men to be secure from the other personnel on the island, and instructed Lt. Col. Doering to advise Colonel Robinson that the training of this group should proceed.

Colonel Bigelow stated that he thought Colonel Rifler conducted a most extensive investigation and was capable of judging whether or not this man was satisfactory.

Lt. Col. Doering brought out the fact that the subject, Kumsung Rio, was to be inducted into the Army, and that it was possible for O.S.S. to defer this man due to the type of work that he was to perform. General Donovan agreed that this man be deferred.

## SUMMARY

It was agreed as follows:

- (1) That security should be approved on Kumsung Rio for operating with the Field Experimental Unit as an agent;
- (2) That Lt. Col. Doering advise Colonel Robinson of General Donovan's decision that training proceed as per the General's directive;
- (3) That no blanket rule could be set down in determining the security of the possible recruits for this mission, but that it was to be worked out between Security and Colonel Rifler, and in the event they could not agree, the matter should be brought to General Donovan's attention for his decision, as in this case;

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- (4) That General Demovan could not evade responsibility and would not want to do so, but was holding Colonel Bifler responsible that security be maintained on the personnel he recruits;
- (5) That Kumsung Ri be deferred from induction into the Army, due to the type of work he is to perform.

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Files

A. van Beuren

Kunsung Ri

30 February 1948

A meeting was held this morning to discuss the above case at which the following were present: General Donovan, Col. Rifler, Col. Deering, Major France, Lieut. Putzell, Mr. Bigelow and Mr. van Beuren.

Col. Rifler outlined in some detail the project in which the Subject is to be used and pointed out that if suitable personnel can be found they will have to be people who have recently been in Korea and who have very strong Korean ties. He indicated that the members of the first units to establish bases in the Zone of Operations must be recruited in this country and that the Subject is an integral part of one of these units. He emphasized the fact that he himself is completely satisfied with the Subject's security and is willing to assume full responsibility for him after making an extensive investigation on his own behalf.

General Donovan stated that in his opinion there were some doubts as to Subject's loyalty but that he realized the exigencies of the project.

It was decided that the Subject could be approved for use with Col. Rifler on this particular mission but that he is not suited for any other use in OSS. Col. Rifler accepts full responsibility for his control in the mission to which he will be assigned.

With regard to training Col. Rifler stated that it would be necessary for the group to have the full OSS course but that the Subject and his fellows should be segregated from other OSS trainees and have no connection with them. It was indicated that suitable areas to effect such segregation are available on Catalina Island. The General instructed that the necessary arrangements be made with Col. Robinson to provide full training and segregation and that Lieut. Putzell should make such arrangements.

It was decided that future questionable cases of this nature should be submitted to General Donovan's Office for determination and discussion when there is a disagreement between the Security Office and Col. Rifler's Branch.

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STANDARD FORM NO. 64

**SECRET**

**Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT**

TO : FILES  
FROM : E. J. Putzell, Jr.  
SUBJECT: Eifler's Project

DATE: 21 February 1945

A meeting was held this morning in the Director's Office at which the following were present:

General Donovan  
Mr. Cheston  
Colonel Eifler  
Colonel Doering  
Colonel Bigelow  
Mr. Van Beuren  
Major Frazer  
Lt. Putzell

The meeting discussed the natives recruited by Colonel Eifler who are now being trained on Catalina Island.

It was decided by the Director that:

1. The particular individual under discussion in the meeting should remain with the rest of the group of natives and continue training;
2. The entire group be given the full OSS course of training in order to equip them for clandestine operations, and
3. Appropriate security precautions should be taken by Schools and Training and the Security Office to separate completely this group of natives from other trainees on the Island and to insure that all concerned receive adequate training.

In accordance with instructions the writer notified Lt. Colonel Blogg in Washington and Colonel Robinson in California of these decisions by telephone this afternoon.

CC: Mr. Van Beuren  
Lt. Colonel Blogg

  
E. J. Putzell, Jr.  
Lt. (jg), USNR  
Asst. Executive Officer

**SECRET**

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

## Office Memorandum

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : General Donovan  
 FROM : The Secretariat  
 SUBJECT: Kunsung Rie

DATE: 14 February 1946

There is attached the Security Office file on the above-named person which we understand you wanted to review. You will recall that the subject is a member of Colonel Eifler's group whose security has been disapproved. Colonel Gregory has proposed, on the basis of certain assurances from Colonel Eifler, that the subject be allowed to proceed with his training on the West Coast provided that it does not involve the divulgence of any important classified material or comprehensive knowledge of OSI activities. Colonel Robinson believes that this is impracticable. Memoranda from Colonel Gregory and Colonel Robinson are attached.

In connection with the Security file, you will want to note particularly the Security Office memorandum dated 27 January 1945, especially the conclusions set forth on page 14, as marked. In addition, you will note that the School report, as marked, concludes that the subject's loyalty must remain questionable.

C. A. Bane

C. A. Bane

SECRET

*in Clinton*

CHS, SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE

**SECRET**Lt. Colonel C. G. Deering, Jr.,  
Executive Officer

8 February 1948

Lt. Colonel Donald H. Gregory

Let. of Security Clearance for Certain Personnel Associated by  
Colonel Carl Rifier.

1. As requested in your telephone conversation of 26 January 1948, I reviewed the security file forwarded to me by Mr. Van Buren, discussed the matter at length with Colonel Carl Rifier, and confirm our telephone conversation of 26 January 1948, to the effect that I did not believe it essential, at this time, to insist upon the discharge from Colonel Rifier's project of the individual in question.

2. I wish it distinctly understood in giving this opinion that I am doing it in a purely advisory capacity, since I have had no direct control or responsibility with regard to Colonel Rifier's project. As you know, Colonel Rifier came to the Coast some months ago on an independent mission, and this office was not authorized to exercise any control over his activities. It follows that the Pacific Coast Area can in no way be responsible for any of his actions, or the success or failure of his mission. It also follows that my comments with respect to the security question are wholly advisory and represent my best, independent judgment based upon the information available.

3. My conclusion is based on the following factors:

a. The unfavorable security report, while on its face clearly showing the possibility of disloyalty, does not show any actual acts of disloyalty, and the unfavorable factors are, by their nature, susceptible to explanation. Colonel Rifier and Lieutenant Nichols, who are experienced security investigators, have been well aware of the unfavorable factors and after a very intensive investigation over a period of months, are each satisfied that the unfavorable factors are negated by other factors which have been developed in the course of their investigation.

b. Colonel Rifier reports that his entire mission and project are built around the individual in question, and that his elimination will be tantamount to the abandonment of the project. While I have no means of determining this to be a fact, I am accepting it as such in view of Colonel Rifier's unequivocal statement.

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14. Colonel Darling, Jr.

-2-

4 February 1948

3. Assuming Colonel Riffler's opinion with respect to the man's loyalty is erroneous, if the information given to him in the course of his instruction and training is limited -- as recommended in Paragraph 4. below -- the damage to the Allied cause would be limited to the failure of one very small, hazardous mission.

4. A period of some months' training is contemplated, during which period the individual in question will be isolated, and it is possible that further information respecting his loyalty will be developed during that period. If the restrictions mentioned in Paragraph 4. below are followed, and if it is eventually determined that the man's loyalty is so questionable as to make his further employment undesirable, any resulting damage would be minimized.

5. From what I know of the nature of the mission planned, it would seem unnecessary to divulge important, classified material to any of the group of which the subject individual is one. There is obviously no need for extensive job orientation or knowledge of OSS activities, and the training required is essentially in such unclassified subjects as fieldcraft, wireless telegraph operation, weapons, etc. It is recommended that the instruction be restricted to items of this nature.

6. Instructions have been issued to the training personnel to so limit the instruction program, irrespective of Colonel Riffler's wishes, until written authority from the Director's Office to the contrary has been obtained. Colonel Riffler advises that he does not concur in the advisability of enforcing this restriction.

7. The above comments and opinion are recognized as departures from any safety first point of view, but have endeavored to take into consideration the exceptional nature of the mission involved, the fact that there appears to be some hazard in dealing with any persons of the nationality involved, and the further factor that frequently "The best way to catch a thief is to employ one."

## Distribution:

Col. G. Edward Burton  
Mr. Charles S. Clinton  
Col. H. L. Robinson  
Col. Earl Riffler  
Lieut. H. H. Clark, USMC  
Mr. Edward W. Haines, WFO

# SECRET

**CONFIDENTIAL**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
 Schools and Training Branch  
 2324 F Street, N.W.  
 Washington, D.C.

7 February 1945

**SUBJECT:** Report on Colonel Eifler's Special Groups  
**TO:** Colonel G. Edward Buxton

1. In order to keep you posted on the situation in regard to the training for Colonel Eifler's special groups at Howlands Landing and Fourth of July Cove on Catalina Island, I am enclosing herewith a copy of report from Major Montague Mead, Commanding Officer, WTC, dated 26 January 1945.

2. Major Mead's report seems to indicate that the situation has improved materially since our last report to you, and I have every confidence that the training will proceed from now on without any more difficulty.

3. For your information, there is one problem in connection with the group of three students at Howlands Landing which has not been solved. Our instructions have been that no students will be transported to the island for training in any of our training areas until such time as they have been approved by the Security Office. Colonel Eifler apparently was not aware of this regulation, with the result that the three students now at Howlands Landing were taken there by him before security approval had been received. Recently we were informed by the Security Office that one of the three students has been disapproved and therefore should be removed from the island. Lt. Col. Gregory informed me by telephone that Colonel Eifler insists this student is all right for his purposes and that if the student is removed, it will cause the complete break-up of this particular unit and all will have to be withdrawn.

4. We are not in a position to pass judgment upon security matters, but we feel that we do have a responsibility insofar as OSS secret training materials are concerned. We have talked to Mr. van Buren of the Security Office, Lt. Col. Doering, Lt. Col. Allen, and Lt. Col. Gregory, and have agreed that no OSS secret materials or instruction shall be given to the group at Howlands Landing until such time as it is decided whether or not the disapproved student shall continue in training or be removed entirely. Colonel Eifler's training program which he has requested from us includes much secret material and I doubt very much whether he will be satisfied if this group is trained only in fieldcraft and other more or less GI subjects which will not particularly fit them for the mission he has in mind. It may be necessary to await the return of the Director before a decision can be made in this matter.

**CONFIDENTIAL**

H. L. ROBINSON  
 Colonel, FA  
 Chief, Schools & Training

1 Encl.



26 January 1963

SUBJECT: The Miller's Camp.

TO : Colonel K. L. Robinson, Chief, Schools & Training Branch,  
O.S.D., Washington, D. C.

1. I would like to write this letter in reply to your letter dated 20 January 1963 which deals with Colonel Miller and his special group in training. First of all, I would like to state that every member of this staff is more than anxious to see all operations, including the Miller program, operate smoothly and harmoniously. We have taken immediate steps to establish a schedule for all boats arriving the two Miller's camps in order that every need which they may have will be taken care of. Lt. Aguirre was contacted as to what demands they would have in this connection, and it was decided that by running a boat on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, of each week, all supply matters would be satisfied. In addition to this, we have set aside one picket boat and crew to be available on call for any emergency run and for the movement of any and all personnel. We have noted that in the case of this standby boat that we be notified the previous day of any contemplated run in order that we may see to it that the boat is functioning properly and will arrive and depart on schedule. The difficulty up to the present time was the lack of prior notification as to when equipment or personnel would arrive, but I believe this matter has been cleared up.

2. I saw Colonel Miller for a moment the other day as he was going to Los Angeles, and he told me at that time one thing that he would need that was not working out well at the present. This is the problem of proper food. It appears that the Orientals are not accustomed to a certain diet, and that the food that we have been feeding him caused constipation among the students, and he suggested that we obtain foods that would eliminate this condition. He further stated that upon his return here, he would give us a menu or list of the proper foods. I am sure that we can obtain these through our regular channels as it includes larger portions of rice and fruits. Colonel Miller was very agreeable and pleasant during our conversation, and when he returns again, I contemplate having a talk with him concerning his operations and will make every effort to correct or improve the operation of his program.

3. After having talked with Major Hardy concerning the training problems and proposed staff, I am sure that this end will function smoothly. Some of the instructors, which we intend to place there,

26 January 1945 - contd.

have arrived during the last few days, and when the others arrive, we will be in a position to fully operate in every department in these two camps.

4. Concerning Colonel Miller's secretary, Miss Fox, we were all completely surprised at her arrival as well as Colonel Miller's, since we have received no previous notification that either was coming. I called Colonel Gregory and explained to him the situation and asked him to speak with Major Carl who was Colonel Miller's representative. After they had talked and I had talked again with Colonel Gregory, it was decided that she would go over for a few days. Colonel Gregory, the next day, confirmed the decision in writing. I can understand the necessity for having someone to type and arrange training schedules and correspondence, but I do not believe that it is wise for such a practice to continue in the future, therefore, the instructions which I have received, namely that no women will visit the island, will be strictly adhered to, unless orders to the contrary are received from higher authority. I am particularly anxious, as all of us are, to see the program out here conducted correctly as you would desire, and all of us will continue to work to this end. Everything has been going along smoothly during the last week.

5. Everybody here was very pleased to see Colonel Allen promoted, and as a result, the edge made was so thick that you could have cut it with a knife. I heard recently that both you and Mr. McCampbell are intending to make a trip out here in the near future and we will all be looking forward to seeing both of you.

MONTAGUE BEAD  
Major, Sig C  
Communications



**CONFIDENTIAL**

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
 Schools and Training Branch  
 2324 F Street, N.W.  
 Washington, D.C.

22 January 1945

**SUBJECT:** Report from Major Montague Head, Sig.C., Commanding Officer, WOTC  
**TO:** Colonel O. Edward Buxton

1. I enclose herewith for your information a copy of Letter Report No. 1 dated 18 January 1945, from Major Montague Head, Sig.C., Commanding Officer, WOTC. I also enclose herewith a copy of my reply to Major Head of even date.
2. I see no reason to take any further action in regard to this matter since no serious harm was done. I have talked to Major Head by telephone since the incident described in his report occurred and I believe that things are progressing smoothly and that there will be no further difficulty. I understand, and I am sure that you also understand, that this report covers only the Schools and Training officers' side of the story and that Colonel Bifler is certainly entitled to his day in court before blame can be squarely placed. I really believe that this incident and possibly others are due to the primary fact that the officers at WOTC are afraid of Colonel Bifler, both on account of his rank and his very aggressive personality. I have been told repeatedly that there is the closest cooperation and feeling of friendliness between the Schools and Training staff and Colonel Bifler's staff on the island, except when Colonel Bifler himself is around, when both staffs apparently become jittery.
3. It would appear to me, therefore, that the simplest way to avoid possible future difficulties would be to keep Colonel Bifler away from the island unless it is absolutely necessary that he be there. Just how this can tactfully be done is a problem which I would prefer that you handle if you agree with me.

*W. L. Robinson*  
 W. L. ROBINSON  
 Colonel, FA  
 Chief, Schools and Training

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

11 January 1945

Report from Major Montague Head, Sig.C., Commanding Officer, WOTC  
Colonel G. Edward Patton

1. I enclose herewith for your information a copy of Letter Report No. 1 dated 18 January 1945, from Major Montague Head, Sig.C., Commanding Officer, WOTC. I also enclose herewith a copy of my reply to Major Head of even date.

2. I see no reason to take any further action in regard to this matter since no serious harm was done. I have talked to Major Head by telephone since the incident described in his report occurred and I believe that things are progressing smoothly and that there will be no further difficulty. I understand, and I am sure that you also understand, that this report covers only the Schools and Training officers' side of the story and that Colonel Rifler is certainly entitled to his day in court before blame can be squarely placed. I really believe that this incident and possibly others are due to the primary fact that the officers at WOTC are afraid of Colonel Rifler, both on account of his rank and his very aggressive personality. I have been told repeatedly that there is the slowest cooperation and feeling of friendliness between the Schools and Training staff and Colonel Rifler's staff on the island, except when Colonel Rifler himself is around, when both staffs apparently become jittery.

3. It would appear to me, therefore, that the simplest way to avoid possible future difficulties would be to keep Colonel Rifler away from the island unless it is absolutely necessary that he be there. Just how this can tactfully be done is a problem which I would prefer that you handle if you agree with me.

M. L. ROBINSON  
Colonel, FA  
Chief, Schools and Training

**CONFIDENTIAL**



**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
 WASHINGTON, D. C.

22 January 1945

Reply to Letter Report No. 1 of 18 January 1945

Major Montague Reed, Major, Commanding Officer, WCTC

1. This will acknowledge receipt of your letter report of 18 January 1945, which covers the incidents of 16 January 1945, pertaining to difficulties in the administration of the Rifle groups and particularly with Colonel Rifler himself.
2. We think that you were correct in submitting this report in order to protect yourself and your officers in case any complaints are made by Colonel Rifler. We do not, however, understand why you raised the question in paragraph 2 of your report, which reads as follows: "How far can we go to stop anything that we do not feel right to be done?" We have told you previously and will repeat here, that you are in command of the West Coast Training Center, which includes all CMC installations operated by the Schools and Training Branch there. As Commanding Officer, you have full authority to take any action which you deem necessary to the effective operation of these areas. Any officer, no matter what his rank, who enters your areas, must do so with your permission and he must conform with the regulations which you have established for the operation of your camp or camps.
3. Colonel Rifler assured us before he left Washington last month that he would do nothing that was in any way contrary to the ground rules in the camps on Catalina Island or on the mainland, and that he would see to it that his staff also conformed. In addition, Colonel Rifler agreed that he would take up directly with me any matters pertaining to policy or any complaints as to conditions in the two camps where his personnel were to be trained and would not create trouble by dealing directly with officers or enlisted men of your command.
4. I wrote to Major Allen today and I would like to quote a portion of my letter to him as follows: "I want to impress upon you and all the rest of the staff that we are faced with the problem of providing the training areas and the training for these groups and that we must either come through satisfactorily or admit that we are incapable of doing the job, which will be tantamount to turning the island over to Colonel Rifler. Major Reed, Major Hardy and yourself have been given full authority to handle any situation which may arise, unless it concerns a matter of policy which you feel should be taken up with higher headquarters. I want you to face this job squarely and I don't want any of you to go around"

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with a chip on your shoulder. You can rest assured that we will back you up here if you are in the right. There is no intention to diminish the effectiveness of the other training on the island to take care of the Rifler groups, but they must be given an equal opportunity with the others."

5. I appreciate that it is difficult for a major to deny a full colonel a request and particularly when that full colonel is as aggressive as Colonel Rifler. This means that you will have to be unusually tactful and cooperative, but it also means that you will have to be firm when you know that you are in the right.

6. I trust that the training for the Rifler groups has by now shaken down and will hereafter operate smoothly and without friction or further difficulty.

H. L. SCHERMAN  
Colonel, PI  
Chief, Schools & Training

cc: Col. O. Edward Buxton

**CONFIDENTIAL**

18 January 1945

SUMMARY: Letter Report Number One

TO : Colonel H. L. Robinson, Chief, Schools and Training Branch,  
P. O. Box 1657, Washington, D. C.

1. Pursuant to our telephone conversation on Wednesday, 17 January 1945, I am submitting a report. On 16 January 1945 (Colonel Rifler) called at 1400 o'clock to Captain Herman on the Island and asked that a boat be dispatched at once for Newport Beach to carry over to Howland's Landing some wire which was urgently needed. Captain Herman informed him that he did not know whether a boat was available at that time but that he would look into the matter at once. Colonel Rifler then informed Captain Herman that he had been held up from his previous schedule to begin his training, namely, Monday, 15 January. He also stated that he had had an officer removed from O.S.S. for holding him up. Captain Herman informed Colonel Rifler that if possible a boat would be dispatched to arrive at Newport Beach at approximately 1615 o'clock that day. I shall mention that this boat was having motor trouble and that at the time there was a small craft warning published. Electrician's mate Hobbs was sent with the boat to make necessary repairs while the boat was enroute. The boat was dispatched and arrived at 1655 o'clock, which was forty minutes late. When he was informed by the captain of the boat that they were going to eat supper, he stated, "For Christ's sake hurry up and find out what the damn boat does leave!" The weather, which was very rough, caused the boat to be delayed. No one at this headquarters knew that Colonel Rifler was coming down to Newport Beach on that date. The only thing we did know was that he had requested that a boat be sent to carry the wire over immediately to Howland's Landing. Colonel Rifler arrived at Newport Beach at 1650 and stated after his arrival that he was annoyed at the speed limit to get down to Newport Beach in view of the fact that the boat had not arrived. Montevia Kiel, an observer on the mainland, informed Colonel Rifler that he did not know of the boat being scheduled to arrive that afternoon, which was true. Colonel Rifler then became quite angry and stated that he was going to write a report to Washington on the inefficient way in which this operation was conducted here on the coast. When the boat did arrive, the crew proceeded to carry out instructions which they had received, namely, to get the wire and then pick up the wire and proceed to Howland's Landing. Colonel Rifler, when he heard that the men were eating, became angry again and stated that he did not know why they could not eat on the Island. In other words, he did not want to be delayed. The crew also quickly saw the boat departed at 1720. Prior to departing, Montevia Kiel instructed the crew to proceed to the Island but if the weather grew any worse, to turn back. The boat made the crossing under very bad weather conditions and

- 2 -

Colonel Rifler became very sick during the crowding. The crowding injured his head and was also thrown upon a table which was broken under his weight, which given an idea of the severity of the crowding. Also, the small life saving boat is leaking about fifteen gallons an hour. As a result of this crowding the boat will be out of commission for about two weeks and will cost around \$200 to repair. After the boat arrived at the Island, Colonel Rifler apologized to the crew for his previous action and shook hands with them and asked them to convey to me his thanks for dispatching the boat and getting him over to the Island.

2. Major Mundy, Major Allen, Commander Mackay, Captain Jordan, and myself all feel that this is just the beginning and that our real progress here on the West Coast is at stake if Colonel Rifler continues to be in the picture. We do, however, feel that a training schedule and an harmonious existence can be conducted with the officers under Colonel Rifler's command. There is little doubt in our minds that this is just the first in a series of unpleasant situations. We all have put considerable effort in establishing the West Coast Training Center and we are very proud of it but we cannot continue not knowing where we stand with Colonel Rifler. How far can we go to stop anything that we do not feel right to be done? He is a full Colonel and we are not in a position to oppose him directly. I believe we have shown discretion in our dealing with all personnel but in this case there appears to be only one side, Rifler's side. We would rather turn the entire thing over to him and get another job in or out of the organization. We have always cooperated with everyone and place the organization and training necessities ahead of anything we may have desired but we cannot be in a position where we are told what to do or be under circumstances like this and still be held responsible for personnel and government property.

ENCLOSURE  
Major, Hq. G.  
Commanding



**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

20 January 1945

**Camps for Special Units (Bifles)**

**Major Hastings Reed, Sig.O., Commanding Officer, 401st**

1. Major France called on me this morning and took up with me some questions concerning the establishment of the two camps for the special units of Colonel Rifler at Highlands Landing and Fourth of July Cove, which questions were put to Major France by Colonel Rifler on the telephone yesterday.

2. Subsequent to my conversation with Major France, I telephoned to you on the next night and gave you verbal instructions concerning the two camps in question, which I am confirming herewith.

3. It is our understanding that Colonel Rifler has one group of students in training at Highlands Landing at the present time and another group here in Washington which will be ready for shipment to the coast as soon as to arrive on or about 1 February 1945. It is our understanding that Colonel Rifler wishes this second group to start their training at Fourth of July Cove. It will be necessary, therefore, that we complete arrangements so that the schools and training branch can assume their responsibilities in both camps by 1 February 1945.

4. We have explained to Major France that we were unable to assume the responsibility for the operation and training of these groups by 15 January 1945 as originally planned, due to the fact that personnel for the boat crews, for the complements, and instructors were not procured in time to meet that date. We hope that Colonel Rifler understands this and also understands that we have done everything humanly possible to procure the necessary personnel in time.

5. Major France asked for a specific date on which schools and training could take over their responsibility at the two camps and we told him that we would be ready by 1 February 1945. This means that by that date we must have in each of the two camps the four enlisted men to form a station complement and a commanding officer, and the necessary instructors as outlined in our letter of 11 December 1944 to Mr. Chertan. For your information, this letter listed the following instructors and subjects: one officer instructor ( demolitions and weapons), one officer instructor (cryptography), one officer instructor (fieldcraft, map reading and compass), one officer instructor (maritime training), and one officer to be supplied by the Communications Branch (radio training).

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

6. We understand that you expect to complete the reorganization of the enlisted personnel for your base areas before 1 February 1961, and that the necessary water transportation to supply these two camps will be available by that time. There are currently in your area the present three (3) enlisted men (including two cooks) and there are scheduled for shipment to you next week additional three (3) enlisted men (including one cook); all of them are station complement personnel. There are also available from your total personnel the eight enlisted men required as complement at the two camps in question. For your information, each camp was to have one MPO (assistant camp commander); one first cook; one second cook; and one man for general duty.

7. The officer designated by you as the Commanding Officer of the two camps will be responsible to you for the security and operations of the two camps and to us as well. The instruction at the two camps will be the responsibility of the Chief Training Officer at us, Major Hundy, and we will look to him to provide instruction that is approved by Colonel Rifler's representative, Major Carl. It is your responsibility that these two camps operate effectively to the satisfaction of Colonel Rifler and of this headquarters. Any complaints or requested changes be previous instructions by Colonel Rifler or any of the members of his staff must be sent to you, as Commanding Officer at WTT, for the necessary execution and action. Any matters concerning policy will be taken up between Colonel Rifler and yourself direct.

8. It is our desire to give Colonel Rifler and his staff the best possible cooperation and we are sure that in return we can rely upon him and his staff to reciprocate.

cc: Major Farnon  
Col. Rifler  
Col. Hutton  
Major Hundy  
R&M Theater Officer

A. L. BORDEN  
Colonel, FA  
Chief, School and Training



**CONFIDENTIAL**



*Handwritten:* **CONFIDENTIAL***Handwritten:* **OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
Schools and Training Branch  
2324 F Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

30 December 1944

*Handwritten:* **SUBJECT:** Training of Special Groups for Colonel Kifler  
**TO:** The Director, OSS. Attention: Col. G. Edward Buxton

1. At the time of our meeting in your office several weeks ago, it was indicated that we could be ready to start training in the two camps selected by Colonel Kifler for his groups on or about 15 January 1945. This arrangement was predicated upon several assumptions:

- (a) That the camps could be gotten ready by that time;
- (b) That additional boats would be available by that time to service the camps;
- (c) That qualified naval personnel would be available to man the boats; and
- (d) That sufficient additional complement and instructors would be available to do the training and housekeeping.

2. From information that we have received from the west coast, it appears that (a) above will be accomplished by 15 January. We do not believe that any of the other three contingencies will be met by that date. We are informed that the two LCVP's which were necessary to haul supplies and personnel by water because there are no docking facilities at either camp, have been ordered to be shipped overland from Albany, New York and, based upon our experience with former shipments, it is doubtful if these boats will arrive within thirty days.


3. In the matter of naval personnel, we are informed that Mr. Cheston has done all that he can with the Coast Guard and Navy, but so far he has not been able to secure the personnel.

4. In the matter of Army officer and enlisted personnel for the administration of the training, we have attempted through PFB to secure these individuals from OSS personnel returning from overseas. Unfortunately, so many of the personnel who have returned are on leave and furlough that as yet we have had little opportunity to interview prospects.

*Handwritten:* **CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

5. We realize that these are our problems and that there is nothing you or Colonel Rifler can do to assist us, but we feel that you should be informed as to the progress so far. If it is decided by you that the training of the Rifler groups shall take precedence over the other training that is being carried on at the island, we would like to have written orders to this effect. We are sending a copy of this letter to Colonel Rifler for his information.

  
H. L. ROBINSON  
Colonel, FA  
Chief, Schools & Training Branch

cc: Col. Rifler  
Col. Gregory  
Maj. Mead

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

30 December 1944

Training of Special Groups for Colonel Haffner

The Director, OSS. Attention: Col. G. Edward Horton

1. At the time of our meeting in your office several weeks ago, it was indicated that we could be ready to start training in the two camps selected by Colonel Haffner for his groups on or about 15 January 1945. This arrangement was predicated upon several assumptions:

- (a) That the camps could be gotten ready by that time;
- (b) That additional boats would be available by that time to service the camps;
- (c) That qualified naval personnel would be available to run the boats; and
- (d) That sufficient additional complement and instructors would be available to do the training and housekeeping.

2. From information that we have received from the west coast, it appears that (a) above will be accomplished by 15 January. We do not believe that any of the other three contingencies will be met by that date. We are informed that the two LST's which were necessary to haul supplies and personnel by water because there are no docking facilities at either camp, have been ordered to be shipped overland from Albany, New York and, based upon our experience with former shipments, it is doubtful if these boats will arrive within thirty days.

3. In the matter of naval personnel, we are informed that Mr. Chapman has done all that he can with the Coast Guard and Navy, but so far he has not been able to secure the personnel.

4. In the matter of Army officer and enlisted personnel for the administration of the training, we have attempted through PPH to secure these individuals from OSS personnel returning from overseas. Unfortunately, so many of the personnel who have returned are on leave and furlough that as yet we have had little opportunity to interview prospects.

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

5. We realize that these are our problems and that there is nothing you or Colonel Rifler can do to assist us, but we feel that you should be informed as to the progress so far. If it is decided by you that the training of the Rifler groups shall take precedence over the other training that is being carried on at the Island, we would like to have written orders to this effect. We are sending a copy of this letter to Colonel Rifler for his information.

**H. L. ROBINSON**  
Colonel, FA  
Chief, Schools & Training Branch

cc: Col. Rifler  
Col. Gregory  
Maj. Reed

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*file*

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
Schools and Training Branch  
3324 F Street, N.W.  
Washington, D.C.

18 January 1945

**SUBJECT:** Training for Special Units for Colonel Eifler  
**TO:** Colonel G. Edward Buxton

1. In order to keep you informed as to the progress of the proposed training for the special groups for Colonel Eifler, I wish to submit the following.

2. We were not able to have in readiness the two camps at Howlands' Landing and Fourth of July Cove by 15 January 1945, which was the tentative date set, due to the fact that we lacked boat crews, complement, and instructors. This information was given to you in our letter of 30 December 1944, and was due to circumstances beyond our control. The enlisted personnel for the boat crews are being recruited on the west coast at the present time and some few have actually reported, but it will not be possible to assign these personnel to specific duties or to form the personnel into crews for each craft until all of them have reported in and Lt. Commander Shebley can see what he has to work with.

3. Our attempts to secure additional enlisted personnel for camp complements for the two camps and instructors to carry on the training at the two camps have met with some success, but we do not as yet have all the personnel needed. You will realize that, where only a small complement is provided and where each individual instructor must be skilled in a certain subject or subjects, the speed of recruitment is considerably slowed down. In order to speed up this process, we are not attempting to select personnel, either for complement or instructors, for specific jobs but are endeavoring to secure the necessary number of bodies so that we can ship them to the west coast and let them make the assignments there from either the new personnel or those already on hand.

4. Colonel Eifler apparently has one group of students whom he is desirous of starting in training at once. Major Mead, Commanding Officer at Catalina Island, phoned me last week and said that Colonel Eifler had insisted on opening at least one camp on Monday, 15 January 1945, whether we were ready for him or not. I talked to Major Frazer here in Washington and later to Captain Aguirre (both of whom are members of Colonel Eifler's staff) on the island and they informed me that Colonel Eifler would undertake to do all training himself and all necessary housekeeping if we could provide him with two cooks. Cooks were and are a scarce category and have been one of the stumbling blocks

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In our endeavor to procure necessary personnel for the two camps. In order to cooperate with Colonel Bifler, however, we arranged with Major Head for him to bring over two cooks from Area III on the mainland so that the one camp at Howlands Landing could be started. Colonel Bifler also agreed, when told that there were not sufficient boat crews available to run a daily supply boat to and from Howlands Landing, that he would be content with one supply a week.

5. As the situation now stands, therefore, Colonel Bifler, at his own insistence, has started operations at Howlands Landing, using his own personnel with the exception of two cooks which are being provided by Major Head and with the understanding that he is to get his supplies once a week from the base camp at Area III.



H. L. ROBINSON  
Colonel, FA  
Chief, Schools and Training

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**CONFIDENTIAL****OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**

Schools and Training Branch

2124 F Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C.


18 January 1945

**SUBJECT:** Training for Special Units for Colonel Eifler**TO:** Colonel G. Edward Buxton

1. Since dictating the letter to you this morning in which we attempted to bring you up to date on the situation concerning the training for the special groups for Colonel Eifler, we received a telephone call from Major Mead, Commanding Officer of the West Coast Training Center, in which he informed us that Colonel Eifler is now at Fourth of July Cove and that he expects to establish his headquarters at this camp and to have some of his staff there with him. This is in addition to the arrangements previously made for the camp at Howlands Landing as detailed in my previous letter.

2. We told Major Mead that this was agreeable, provided Colonel Eifler made no further demands upon Major Mead for additional personnel or personnel transportation or supplies until such time as the whole complement, boat crews, and instructors are available. Major Mead stated that Colonel Eifler understood this and that he would take care of things himself.

3. Subsequent to this telephone call, we received another telephone call from Major Mead in which he stated that Colonel Eifler had requested a boat to bring over some personnel, including a woman, to Fourth of July Cove. For your information, there have been definite orders given that no women are to be permitted in our training areas on the island and no unauthorized personnel, including women, are to be transported in any OSS craft. We reminded Major Mead of the existing instructions and he stated that he knew this and had mentioned same to Colonel Eifler but that Colonel Eifler stated that this woman was his secretary and he wanted her at Fourth of July Cove. We told Major Mead that we would not authorize this and that it would be necessary for Colonel Eifler to take the matter up with you in case he wanted to over-ride our instructions.

  
H. L. ROBINSON  
Colonel, FA  
Chief, Schools and Training

**CONFIDENTIAL**

CONFIDENTIAL

4 December, 1944

Subject: Incoming shipment consigned: Brig. Gen. H. J. Donovan, G-2, Washington, D. C.

To: Commanding General, New York Port of Substitution, 4th Ave. & 80th St., Brooklyn, N. Y. Attn: Port Trans. Officer, Baggage and Effects Section.

1. This headquarters has been advised that there is on board at N. Y. P. S. an incoming shipment consigned as above containing:

1 ea. Can, Anti-aircraft, Japanese Type 841  
OO rds. (approx) Ammunition for above.

2. This item was turned over to Col. Carl F. Miller of this agency by Maj. General Merrill of the India Burma Theater, and its intended use in Washington is for training and display purposes of O.S.S. personnel destined for Far Eastern duty.

3. Accordingly, it is requested release of same be expedited and the unit be turned over to the Port Strategic Services Officer at N.Y.P.S. (Lt. A. A. Reams) who will arrange transportation to Washington.

Wm. J. Donovan  
Director

cc: Mr. W. M. Mayo  
Mr. J. L. Hoover  
Lt. A. A. Reams

CONFIDENTIAL

**UNITED STATES COAST GUARD**

POST OFFICE BOX 50  
NORFOLK 1, VA.



ANSWER REPLY TO THE  
DISTRICT COAST GUARD OFFICER (d)  
FIFTH NAVAL DISTRICT  
REFER TO FILE: 601


25 August, 1944

Mr. G. Edward Burton  
Acting Director  
Office of Strategic Services  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sir:

Thank you for your letter of 20 August, expressing appreciation for the cooperation given you by the Virginia Beach Coast Guard Station in a recent OSS experiment near Fort Story, Virginia. I shall be very glad to bring your fine comments to the attention of Lieutenant Pool, and the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard.

Sincerely yours,

  
D. F. FIRLAI,  
Commodore, U. S. Coast Guard  
District Coast Guard Officer  
Fifth Naval District

19 August 1964

Mr. [redacted], U. S. Coast Guard  
 [redacted] [redacted], N. H.  
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

I wish to express my sincere appreciation for the splendid cooperation given this organization by Coast Guard personnel and for their assistance in carrying out a research project near Fort Story, Virginia.

Lt. Commander Carlisle Kelley was kind enough to contact Captain Herman O. Mayrho, Norfolk, Virginia, through whom arrangements were made for the necessary aid of the Coast Guard in completing this project. Captain Mayrho was very cooperative and helpful in providing a Coast Guard boat and crew. Captain [redacted] of this office, who was in charge of the experiment, states that Lieutenant Ford and the four members of the boat crew did a splendid job and their efforts are commendable.

Without the aid of the Coast Guard personnel and equipment it would have been impossible to have completed this experiment.

Sincerely yours,

Charles S. Houston  
 Assistant Director

Form 100-10

Date 5 July 1964

To: General Canine

For your information.

A copy of the attached  
has been sent to report

Prago.

*J. J. Canine*  
J. J. Canine  
Major, USA

Office of the Secretariat

(120)



UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

ADDRESS REPLY TO  
THE COMMANDANT (OPS)  
REFER TO FILE: CG-6614

WASHINGTON

29 June 1944

Mr. G. Edward Burton  
Acting Director  
Office of Strategic Services  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Burton:

It is a pleasure to acknowledge your letter of 20 June 1944 and to know that the Coast Guard was able to be of assistance to you in conducting your experiments on 10 June under the direction of Captain Frasee.

Those in the Coast Guard who took part in this experiment were enthusiastic about the splendid way the entire experiment was conducted and coordinated by your organization. Please feel at liberty to call upon the Coast Guard, at any time, we may be of assistance in the important work you are doing.

Sincerely yours,



L. T. GELKER  
Assistant Commandant

JUN 30 1944

*Field Experiment at Little Neck Cove*  
*8 June 1944*

20 June 1944

Dear Admiral G. H. Rowan, USN  
Chief of Naval Airship Training & Experimentation  
Naval Air Station  
Lakehurst, New Jersey

Dear Admiral Rowan:

The Office of Strategic Services appreciates the splendid cooperation you and your organization extended us in conducting the experiment at Little Neck Cove, New Jersey on 16 June 1944.

It is hoped that this successfully conducted experiment will further the war effort.

Sincerely yours,

G. BRAD HATCH  
Acting Director

*Should be transmitted June 11, 1944*  
*to Coast Guard*

23 June 1944

The Commandant, U. S. Coast Guard  
 1200 F Street, N. W.  
 Washington, D. C.

Dear Sir:

The splendid cooperation given the Office of Strategic Services by the Coast Guard in conducting an experiment on the East Coast of the United States on 10 June 1944 is sincerely appreciated. Captain Fennell, USCG, states that without the courtesy and consideration shown this organization by the United States Coast Guard the successful conclusion of the experiment would have been impossible.

We wish to thank Captain Norman S. Hall, USCG, Washington D. C., Captain E. A. Griffin, USCG, Philadelphia Pa., Captain E. A. Hall, USCG, Philadelphia Pa., Commander Mark A. Grisham, USCG, Washington D. C., Lt. Commander James S. Fletcher, USCG, Philadelphia Pa., and Lt. Commander Carlton Easley, USCG, Washington D. C., for their assistance.

We feel that the following listed personnel are entitled to special commendation for their whole hearted interest and the many off duty hours they devoted in making this experiment a success in the furtherance of the war effort:

RONDS LIFEBOAT STATION

(S.)  
 (Encs.)

Excellent record of your organization and all personnel observing the experiment were most laudable in their praise of the United States Coast Guard.

Sincerely yours,

C. EDWIN HUTTON  
 Acting Director

TO: Mr. Boardman

For your files, Colonel Johnson has  
disseminated this memo with the original.

Placed in, United  
Major, Infantry

DATE 26 October 1944

TO: The Secretariat

For your files. Colonel Sigelow has  
discussed this name with the General.

*FNS*  
Floyd R. Frasee  
Major, Infantry

1744 OCT 27 1944  
1345 OCT 27 1944

*Tr. Can*  
*15*

ET.



**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

FIELD EXPERIMENTAL UNIT

28 September 1944

**TO:** Brig. General William J. Donovan  
**FROM:** Major Floyd H. Frasse  
**SUBJECT:** T.C.A. For Colonel Carl F. Rifler and 2nd Lt. George Roberts

1. Colonel Rifler has stated to the General in his original plan that it would be necessary for him to proceed to the Territory of Hawaii to complete his recruiting program, as he was convinced that he would be unable to locate in the United States the required Korean personnel. He further pointed out that he would be unable to present his overall plan to the General (which was to be ready within three months) until he had been to the Territory of Hawaii and completed the preliminary field work there. Formal request was made to the General for T.C.A. for Colonel Carl F. Rifler and 2nd Lt. George Roberts on 19 July 1944. When Colonel Rifler left here on 27 July 1944 it was understood that Commander Halliwell would arrange for T.C.A. However, while I was on my leave Major Carl contacted Commander Halliwell and was informed by him that he felt he could do nothing further on securing T.C.A. for Colonel Rifler until he (Commander Halliwell) returned to Hawaii.
2. Previous to Commander Halliwell's return to Hawaii arrangements were made for Colonel Rifler and Commander Halliwell to meet on the west coast. At this meeting Commander Halliwell informed Colonel Rifler that he would secure the T.C.A. at an early date. This proposed meeting was mentioned in Major Carl's report of Field Experimental Unit activities on 4 September 1944, in which he again pointed out the necessity for Colonel Rifler to have permission to visit Hawaii.
3. On about 20 September 1944 Colonel Bigelow, at my request, contacted Lt. Colonel Deering with regard to expediting the T.C.A. Lt. Colonel Deering followed through on this conversation and cablegram number 323 was received from Commander Halliwell stating that approval for Colonel Rifler to visit Hawaii had been delayed. However, this reply is entirely too indefinite. Colonel Rifler cannot present his overall plan to the General within the three (3) months he had stated he would require, as practically two months have now elapsed.
4. At the present time Colonel Rifler feels that he is not getting the proper support as promised him with regard to obtaining T.C.A. for his recruiting trip to Hawaii. This delay is seriously impeding the progress that Colonel Rifler would like to make.

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5. It is urgently requested that action be expedited T.C.A. for Colonel Rifler and 2nd Lt. Roberts to Hawaii be taken as soon as possible in order that he may carry out his assignment.

*Floyd R. Plazas*

FLOYD R. PLAZAS  
Major, Infantry  
Executive Officer  
Field Experimental Unit

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

## FIELD EXPERIMENTAL UNIT

20 September 1944

TO: Brig. General William J. Donovan  
 FROM: Major Floyd R. France  
 SUBJECT: T.C.A. For Colonel Carl F. Rifer and Maj. Lt. George Roberts

1. Colonel Rifer has stated to the General in his original plan that it would be necessary for him to proceed to the Territory of Hawaii to complete his recruiting program, as he was convinced that he would be unable to locate in the United States the required German personnel. He further pointed out that he would be unable to present his overall plan to the General (which was to be ready within three months) until he had been to the Territory of Hawaii and completed the preliminary field work there. Formal request was made to the General for T.C.A. for Colonel Carl F. Rifer and Maj. Lt. George Roberts on 12 July 1944. When Colonel Rifer left here on 20 July 1944 it was understood that Commander Halliwell would arrange for T.C.A. However, while I was on my leave Major Carl contacted Commander Halliwell and was informed by him that he felt he could do nothing further on securing T.C.A. for Colonel Rifer until he (Commander Halliwell) returned to Hawaii.
2. Previous to Commander Halliwell's return to Hawaii arrangements were made for Colonel Rifer and Commander Halliwell to meet on the west coast. At this meeting Commander Halliwell informed Colonel Rifer that he would secure the T.C.A. at an early date. This proposed meeting was mentioned in Major Carl's report of Field Experimental Unit activities on 4 September 1944, in which he again pointed out the necessity for Colonel Rifer to have permission to visit Hawaii.
3. On about 20 September 1944 Colonel Sigel, at my request, contacted Lt. Colonel Deering with regard to expediting the T.C.A. Lt. Colonel Deering followed through on this communication and telegram number 122 was received from Commander Halliwell stating that approval for Colonel Rifer to visit Hawaii had been delayed. However, this reply is entirely too indefinite. Colonel Rifer cannot present his overall plan to the General within the three (3) months he had stated he would require, as practically one month has now elapsed.
4. At the present time Colonel Rifer feels that he is not getting the proper support as promised him with regard to obtaining T.C.A. for his recruiting trip to Hawaii. This delay is seriously impeding the progress that Colonel Rifer would like to make.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

5. It is urgently requested that action be expedited T.C.A. for  
Colonel Miller and Maj Lt. Roberts to Hawaii to take up duty in order  
that he may carry out his assignment.

FRANK E. FRANK  
Major, Infantry  
Executive Officer  
Field Department Unit

022

23 1 49 02 430 440

13/01/1963

CONFIDENTIAL

044 Form 9151

044

To: General Donovan

Colonel Buxton suggested that  
the attached be given to you upon  
your return.

J. M. Scribner

*Handwritten:*  
HWA  
WJD  
PT

Office of the Executive Officer

(30449)

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

19 June 1944

**MEMORANDUM**

**TO:** Colonel G. Edward Buxton  
**FROM:** J. M. Scribner  
**SUBJECT:** Attached Memorandum for General Donovan from Captain Frasca dated 17 June 1944

As you may recall, in a recent meeting in General Donovan's office, at which time I raised the question of future plans for the Field Experimental Unit (Eifler), General Donovan expressed the intention of discussing Eifler and his group with Secretary Stimson to the end that they might be sent to the Philippines as part of OSS or otherwise.

At that time, he requested I prepare for him a brief summary showing the background of the various personnel already recruited, in order that he might submit to the Secretary a more comprehensive picture.

Saturday I asked him if he wished this memorandum for the aforementioned purpose prior to his departure and he replied that he would not have time and that I should take it up with you for implementation. I will be very glad to discuss the matter with you at your convenience.

*JMS*  
 J. M. Scribner  
 Deputy Director, SSO

Attachments

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES**  
**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

17 June 1944

**TO:** Mr. J. M. Scribner  
 for General Donovan

**FROM:** Captain Floyd R. Frasco

**SUBJECT:** Qualifications of Personnel Assigned to Field Experimental Unit.

1. Colonel Carl F. Nisler: Overseas
2. Colonel G. H. Richmond, British Army: Overseas
3. Captain Vincent L. Carl: Overseas

4. Captain Floyd R. Frasco: Age 33. Innovative Officer. Field Experimental Unit.

A. **Military Experience:** - OTC graduate 1931. 1932 - 1933 H.M.C. Commissioned as Second Lieutenant 27 September 1932. 1933, two weeks Co. Commander A Co., 34th Infantry. 1937, two weeks Battalion Adjutant, 1st Battalion, 34th Infantry. 3 February 1942, called to active duty, Fort Bastie, Virginia, small arms instructor. April 1942 reported to Office of Strategic Services. 24 May 1942 shipped overseas with 1st. 101. Twenty months foreign service. Familiar with all phases of 1st. 101's operation. Held the following assignments: Adjutant, School Commandant, weapons, unarmed combat, junglecraft and map reading instructor, supply officer, mess officer, Commander of the (Purple Guard).

B. **Civilian Experience:** - Graduated Pennsylvania State College, 1931; Bowman Tech School, 1932 Horological (watchmaking) school. Certified watchmaker (by Horological Institute of America). Owner and operator chain of jewelry stores, ten years.

C. **Travel:** - Philippines, Cuba, Bermuda, England, Germany, Switzerland, Italy, China, Burma, India, Canada.

D. **Languages:** - Spanish, speak, read and write a little; Italian, speak a little; Chinese (Mandarin), speak a little; Hindustani, speak a little.

5. Lieut. Lee E. Nichols, USNR: Age 37

A. **Military Experience:** - Entered U. S. Navy 10 April 1943 as Lieutenant (jg) USNR. Two months indoctrination school, Tucson, Arizona. Graduated 12 June 1943. One month Basic Naval Intelligence School, Frederick, Maryland and assigned to Mare Island, California as



Officer in Charge of Civil Police. This Police Force consisted of 870 civilian officers and was the third largest police department in California. Was also in charge of Coast Guard Beach Patrol, consisting of fifty Coast Guard enlisted men with trained dogs. Entered Office of Strategic Services, 7 March 1944. Has completed training in "B", "A-4" and "F" schools.

B. Civilian Experience: - Entered U. S. Customs Service 11 April 1938 as Patrol Inspector, Los Angeles, California. Employed in this capacity on California Coast and border until 1938 when moved to San Juan, Puerto Rico as Assistant Chief Customs Patrol Inspector in July 1938. Was made Assistant Customs Agent, New York, N. Y. 3 March 1939. Work consisted of investigating narcotic smuggling activities. Transferred to Nogales, Arizona as Customs Agent June, 1939. General Tariff Act investigations on Arizona border and in Mexico until September 1941, at which time transferred to Laredo, Texas. Employed in investigating violations of Tariff Act, Trading With The Enemy Act and Export Control Act, on Texas border and in Mexico. Entered U. S. Navy in April, 1943. Became expert pistol shot and fired with the World Champion U. S. Treasury pistol team from 1936 to 1941. Broke many individual world records and won the National individual .45 championship at Camp Perry, Ohio in September, 1941. Expert instructor in all small arms.

C. Languages: - Spanish; speak, read and write fluently.

D. Travel: - Entire republic of Mexico, Cuba, Puerto Rico, St. Thomas, St. Martin, Martinique, Trinidad, Aruba (all in West Indies) and entire United States.

G. Lieut. John W. Stanfield, USNR; Age 32.

A. Military Experience: - Entered U. S. Navy 23 March 1943, commissioned as Lieutenant (jg). Was assigned to Tucson, Arizona for indoctrination school, 15 April 1943. Completed school 12 June 1943. Duty stations: was training officer, Mare Island Navy Yard, Mare Island, California. Served in this capacity 16 June 1943 to 30 March 1944, supervising 2000 civilian and military personnel for servitome tasks on this Navy Yard. Entered Office of Strategic Services on 3 April 1944.

B. Civilian Experience: - July 1941 to March 1943 was counsellor for the U. S. Training Division on Mare Island Navy Yard. Supervised placement and training of 1800 craftsmen on the Navy Yard. Also supervised an office staff of eight people and five subordinates counsellors. From October 1941 to July 1942 was cost analyst for Barrett and Hill, large west coast contractors engaged in U. S. Navy contracts, aggregating \$ 5,000,000. From July 1937 to September 1941 was investigator

for the State of California, Department of Welfare and the State Controller's Office. During this time I was also on loan on two occasions to State Senate investigating bodies, investigating subversive activities in the State of California.

While attending the university it was necessary for me to work during the summer months to be able to return to school in the fall. These summer jobs were of wide and varied experience. I have done everything, from running gold mills to working in the Kansas wheat fields. I have headed over the entire United States and at one time even stooped so low as to become a fortune teller. I merely mention these things because of the wide experience they gave me.

C. Education: - Attended University of Illinois 1933 - 1934. Attended University of Southern Illinois 1934 - 1936. Majors - Education, English and History. Minors - Political Science, Psychology and Economics. While in the university I was editor of the school paper, active in intercollegiate debate, several honorary letters and honorary journalistic fraternity. At the present time my interests are in criminology and investigating. I have done wide reading in both fields. Academic training in French and Spanish. No proficiency.

7. Second Lieutenant Pedro J. Aguirre - Age 36

A. Military Experience: - Enlisted in U. S. Army as private 28 September 1942. 18 weeks Armed Forces Basic Training, Medium Tank Platoon, Fort Knox, Kentucky. Made Corporal 26 January 1943. Went to Officer's Candidate School, Class number 27, Camp Hood, Texas. Graduated 30 April 1943 with commission of Second Lieutenant. Officers Post Graduate Class number 8, Camp Hood, Texas. Graduated 16 May 1943. Assigned to 678th Tank Destroyer Battalion 4 June 1943. Served as Platoon Commander until 2 April 1944 at which time entered Office of Strategic Services. Have completed training in schools at Areas "B", "A-4", "C" and "A-5". Expert instructor in three inch towed anti-tank gun, 80 mm Mortar, 30 Caliber machine gun, Thompson sub machine gun, M-3, Springfield, Enfield, Carbine, 45 Automatic, M-1 Rifle, map reading and other basic military subjects including direct fire and simplified indirect fire.

B. Civilian Experience: - Two years in Mexico, running irrigation systems. Entire life with exception of time in military service spent on Mexican Border. One and one half years Police Department, Calexico, California, as patrolman and investigator. Salesman, California and Mexico, 12 years.

C. Languages: Spanish, read, speak and write fluently.

D. Travel: Extensive travel in Mexico and Western United States.

8. Technical Sergeant George Roberts; Age 36

A. Military Experiences - Enlisted in U. S. Army, October 1939, Fort Missoula, Montana, in Coast Artillery Corps. Transferred to Hawaiian Military Police June 1940. Reenlisted October 1941, same organization. Discharged by purchase July, 1944 to accept Civil Service appointment. Enlisted Hawaiian National Guard September 1947, Co. D, 290th Inf. Discharged, convenience of Government, 1950. Enlisted as volunteer officer candidate, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, November 1943. Took Infantry basic training, Camp Roberts, California. Discharged, June 1944 due to lack of quota for Officers Candidate School. Enlisted at Fort Myer, Virginia 20 January 1944 for Office of Strategic Services. Have completed training in schools at "A-4", "A-3" and "D". Expert instructor in 30 Caliber machine gun, Thompson submachine gun, .31 mm mortar, M-3, Springfield, Mafeld, Carbine, M-1, 45 automatic and all other hand guns.

B. Civilian Experiences - Entered U. S. Customs Service as Inspector, July 1938 at Honolulu, T. H. Employed in this capacity until January 1941, promoted to Lieutenant of Customs Guards. Held this position until entry into military service. For two years of this time he was engaged in intelligence work for the U. S. Navy in Hawaii, covering crew members of Japanese Naval Vessels. Most of the work during entire Customs service was among orientals, i.e. Koreans, Japanese, Chinese and Filipinos.

C. Languages: Hawaiian, speak, read and write well. Japanese, speak well, read and write fair.

9. Technical Sergeant Edmund C. Cleveland; Age 45

A. Military Experiences: Enlisted in U. S. Army May 1917 as Private, 164th Infantry, Mamarok, N. D. Transferred to 18th Infantry December 1918 in La Courtine, France. Served winter of 1917 and 1918 at Verdun-Toul Defensive Sector; April 1918 Cantigny Defensive Sector; May and June 1918, Montdidier-nyon Offensive; July 1918 Marne-Aisne Offensive; September 1918, St. Mihiel; October and November 1918 Meuse-Argonne. Entire length of foreign service was fifteen months. Wounded in Cantigny. Engaged in scouting and patrolling duties through all offensives listed above. Discharged Fort Des Moines, Iowa, 19 March 1919. Enlisted 7 April 1944, Fort Myer, Virginia for service in Office of Strategic Services. Completed training in schools at "A", "A-4", "A-5" and "A-5". Expert instructor in 30 caliber machine gun, Thompson sub-machine gun, M-1, M-3, Springfield, Mafeld, and all handguns.

B. Civilian Experiences: - Entered U. S. Customs Service November 1929, as Customs Patrol Inspector at Detroit, Michigan. Transferred to Texas in same capacity May 1931. Worked smuggling investigations on Mexican Border and Gulf Coast. Entered Secret Service as Field Operator April 1934. Resigned from Secret Service to accept position of Assistant Customs Agent, July, 1935, at San Antonio, Texas. Engaged

in investigations of Tariff Act violations on Mexico-Texas border and in Mexico until November, 1936, at which time transferred to San Francisco, California where work consisted of narcotic smuggling and Japanese espionage in conjunction with Department of Justice from Seattle to San Antonio, Texas. Returned to San Antonio, Texas, July 1937. Transferred to New York, New York as Customs Agent September 1937. Engaged in narcotic smuggling investigations there until November, 1938, then transferred to Laredo, Texas. Worked Mexican border from Brownsville, Texas to Del Rio, Texas until transferred to El Paso, Texas, in July 1940. Stationed El Paso, Texas as Customs Agent until entered military service in April 1944.

C. Languages: Spanish: speak, read and write well. Russian: speak and understand slightly. French: speak and understand slightly.

10. Staff Sergeant Harold L. Johnson: Age 43

A. Military Experience: Four months with Office of Strategic Services. Has completed training in schools at "G", "A-4", "E", and "A-5".

B. Civilian Experience: One year teaching mathematics, blueprints and Machinist theory on Mare Island, California, Navy Yard to classes consisting of approximately 30% Filipinos. Four months in charge of construction gang in Albuquerque, New Mexico consisting of Mexicans and Indians. One year hydraulic mechanic, Consolidated Aircraft, San Diego, California. Ten months marine machinist, Mare Island, California.

C. Languages: - Understand some Spanish. Do not speak or read.

11. Staff Sergeant Ross Wantland: Age 39

A. Military Experience: - Two months with Office of Strategic Services. Completed training in schools at "G", "A-4", "E", and "A-5".

B. Civilian Experience: - Lived on Mexican border for 20 years. Ten years handling Mexican laborers. Fifteen months experience administering distribution of finances to Chinese cotton ranchers in Mexico. Expert diesel and heavy duty equipment mechanic. Two years experience with U. S. Engineers in civilian capacity, building airports on Christmas and Canton Islands in the Southwest Pacific, (1942-1943). Three months in Prince Rupert, B. C. with U. S. Engineers.

C. Languages: - Spanish, read, write and speak fair.

D. Travel: - Native Western United States, Mexico (States of Sonora and Lower California), Hawaii, Cuba, Malindi, Haifa, Palmyra, Christmas, Fanning, Canton and Midway Islands, Alberta and British Columbia, Canada.

12. Private Harold E. Slack: Age 32

A. Military Experience: - Enlisted in Army 2 May 1944, San Antonio, Texas, for service with Office of Strategic Services. Has finished schools at "B" and "A-2".

B. Civilian Experience: - 21 years as cattle rancher. 19 months as Texas Ranger. Six months Deputy Sheriff in Texas. 36 months investigator with Game, Fish and Oyster Commission of Texas. 18 months as Customs Patrol Inspector at Laredo, Texas and in Mexico investigating narcotic smuggling activities. Expert small arms instructor, Springfield, Carbine, Submachine, M-3 and all hand guns.

C. Languages: - Spanish, speak, read and write fluently.

D. Travel: - All of Central and Western United States and entire Mexican-U. S. Border. Native republics of Mexico.

*Floyd R. Frazer*

FLOYD R. FRAZER  
Captain, Infantry  
Executive Officer  
Field Experimental Unit



750  
SECRET

File: 100001R000100180001-4  
New Delhi.

12 June, 1944.

Brigadier General William J. Donovan,  
Office of Strategic Services,  
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

The following is a report of my activities since April 17th, 1944, to date. Since my last report, I have visited all OSS establishments in Corsica, Italy, Cairo and India, with the exception of the South East Asia Command at Ceylon.

While in Italy, I contacted and gave demonstrations of OSS equipment to Army Headquarters at Biserte, Army Headquarters, Fifth Army on the Italian front, the Sixth and Second Corps on the Italian front. Travels involved visiting Anzio beach head and the troops before Cassino. Demonstrations were given in Cairo, (Egypt), New Delhi, Calcutta and Masira, Assam and Simla (India). Some of the special items were taken into the jungles in Burma and demonstrated to General Stilwell at his combat headquarters.

His Excellency Sir Dorman Smith, Governor of Burma, was greatly impressed with the demonstration, and also with the work that has been accomplished by OSS in Burma today. He has made arrangements for me to visit the Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill on my next visit to London, and has requested that I give him an informal verbal report of all activities in Burma.

Attached is a list of names of those who attended the demonstration at New Delhi, in which you will notice two General Officers were present. At all of these demonstrations, intense interest has been shown and the question most often put to me is, "When can we secure this equipment?" I have attempted to explain that the equipment would arrive in the theater through normal channels when ordered, that if there were any special problems facing anyone at the present time, I was quite sure that OSS, Washington, could and would deliver this equipment according to the priority placed upon it by the Theater Commander.

While in New Delhi, Colonel Berne and myself were requested to visit Colonel H.M. Romelly, SEA Headquarters Supply Officer for unorthodox groups other than SOE. He asked how he might obtain special OSS equipment and gave us a list of underwater equipment which he wished to obtain for experimental purposes for use in future operations in the SEAC. As there is no OSS policy at the present time for furnishing OSS equipment to British agencies other than SOE, I suggested to Colonel Berne that this request be put through normal channels and that I would include it in my report to you. In this instance, I think it highly desirable that this request be granted and also that an OSS policy be laid down for British agencies other than SOE to regulation



While in Burma, I contacted Father James Stuart, whom I am sure you will remember. He was high in his praise of the work of Warrant Officer Bob Rhea of the Field Photographic Unit, stating that the work of Bob Rhea had heaped mountains of credit on OSS. I attach hereto a letter of commendation from Father Stuart and suggest that a letter or wire from you would be highly appreciated in recognition of this fine work.

It is my opinion that it is a necessity that a catalogue be made listing description, pictures and possible use of OSS devices, that each Theater Officer have one of these and that it be kept up to date by sending out changes as they occur. I believe that Captain Frazer in my Office in Washington can successfully get up this catalogue and keep it up to date. I realize the opposition that has prevented this catalogue from being produced before but feel that the arguments against the catalogue cannot in any manner sustain the harm that is being done to the men in the field by not having a ready reference of equipment available to them. This, as well as the supply problem, are the two main reasons for the delay between the actual development of an OSS toy and its use in actual combat.

I have completely turned over my organization to Colonel Coughlin with the exception of one fund turned over to me by General Stilwell which will be completed within the next few days. I shall then proceed to Algiers according to your instructions. I have not heard anything further on my proposed entry to Country X and I have made no further attempts along this line, not knowing what your wishes are at the present time.

Sincerely,

CARL BIFLER  
Colonel, Infantry.

Enclosures:

1. List of those in attendance at demonstration of OSS equipment in New Delhi.
2. General Outline - Communications Branch Supply Base - Calcutta.
3. Letter of commendation on Warrant Officer Robert Rhea.
4. Memorandum by R.M. Braggins, Jr., - Focusing of K.20 Camera.
5. Major Lucy's plan for establishment of branch of R&D in field.
6. Memorandum for Colonel H.M. Romelly.

From

OSS special equipment. I am quite confident in the case of Colonel Roselly that his request for supplies will run into large amounts.

Brigadier R. O'Brien, Assistant Director Military Intelligence, G.H.Q. India, and Colonel J. Westall, Director of Naval Intelligence South East Asia Command, visited me on 11 June and made arrangements for a demonstration to be given in the War Room British G.H.Q. New Delhi on 13 June.

It is my feeling that the time delay between the development of special OSS equipment and the use of such equipment in the field is now but a supply problem.

As to problems facing Army Commanders in the field, while visiting the Fifth Army in Italy, I was requested by G-3, a General Officer, to visit him. He asked me if OSS could silence a group of large guns that were battering their position by use of sabotage. The problem was an interesting one to me. I turned it over to Colonel Carter for follow-up and action.

While in Bari, our SO-SI agent informed me of a problem of the 15th Air Force. The problem involved the burning of some 300 oil barges that were normally towed up a river by tugs. The solution suggested was the bombing of the first few oil barges, releasing a stream of oil on the river to flow down around the other barges, the oil to be ignited by our City Slicker bomb. To this end, I gave the agent a wire to Colonel Buxton requesting fifteen City Slicker bombs to be forwarded to OSS Headquarters, Bari, Italy.

While in Calcutta, I contacted Major Horton of the Communications Section and looked over his place. I think he is on the right track. I requested from him a general outline of what he wishes to do and I attach this outline to this report, recommending Major Horton's efforts so far very highly.

While in London, I learned of a small but important job performed by the Field Photographic Unit and requested of Robert M. Braggins, Jr., that he file a report of this job to the Field Photographic Branch Office in Washington, a copy of which I attach for your personal information as it is one of the small forgotten jobs which are usually given no credit but do much to build up the prestige of OSS in a theater.

While in India, I contacted Major Sam Lucy and carefully went over plans for the establishment of a branch of R&D in the field. I attach hereto copy of Major Lucy's plan as well as his request to the Commanding General, Headquarters USAF, CBI, for the establishment of a Research & Development Laboratory, together with approval. I heartily concur in everything Major Lucy is doing to date and request that the agencies in Washington give him their whole-hearted support.

And secure 1.

## LIST OF THOSE IN ATTENDANCE AT DEMONSTRATION OF ONE BOMBING IN NEW DELHI

NAME	RANK	ORGANIZATION
Dan I. Sultan	Maj. Gen.	CBI
G. M. Rogers	Brig. Gen.	CMC (I)
A. C. Behanman	Colonel	SC
F. W. Bullock	Colonel	TNO (SC)
H. T. Croswell	Colonel	HQ USAF CBI
George W. Outland	Colonel	SCS
H. M. Remelly	Colonel	HQ SAC SEA
W. C. Wood	Colonel	Force 136
Harry L. Berne	Lt. Col.	CSS
John B. Luntagen	Lt. Col.	HQ USAF CBI
R. Patterson	Lt. Col.	G-2
Vera F. Stratton	Comdr.	HQ SAC SEA
Charles W. Allen	Major	A-4-C
L. C. Beall, Jr.	Major	G-2
G. M. Bemis	Major	HQ USAF CBI
H. B. Hinamon	Major	SCS
J. V. Lantermen	Major	CSS
S. G. Lucy	Major	CSS
J. D. MacDonald	Major	HQ USAF CBI
D. E. MacKenzie	Major	CIC
G. A. Pace	Major	SCS
H. L. Peavy	Major	G-2
W. B. Rose	Major	G-2
W. P. Scott	Major	SCS
Leonard Stump	Major	SCS
A. K. Tunnel	Major	SCS
E. B. Wilcox	Major	SCS
Leroy B. Wilson	Major	MIS-X
G. T. Christiansen	Major	G-3
John J. Drislane	Captain	SCS
F. G. Foulk	Captain	SCS
C. W. Halsey	Captain	SCS
W. B. Harding, Jr.	Captain	CSS
William A. Heindl	Captain	HQ USAF CBI
Douglas G. Knight	Captain	SCS
George Chew	Captain	HQ USAF CBI
D. G. Mandelbaum	1st Lt.	SCS
Edward C. Ottman	1st Lt.	CSS
George L. Wilson	1st Lt.	SCS
B. L. Schyonburg	1st Lt.	CIC
E. S. White	2nd Lt.	MIS-X
	2nd Lt.	CIC
N. O. Prosser (Mr.)		CIC
Edmund Fong (Mr.)		CIC

SECRET

- 1 -

NAME	NAME	ORGANIZATION
John R. McFall	T/Sgt.	WTS-X
C. F. Gentile	Cpl.	CIC
James D. Brooks	Pfc	CIC
F. S. O'Neill	Pfc	CIC
Leo R. Wisniewski	Pfc	CIC

U. S. ARMY EXPERIMENTAL STATION  
COMMUNICATIONS BRANCH  
A.P.O. 608

May 11, 1944

SECRET

Subject: Communications Branch Supply Base  
To: Colonel Carl Miller

1. The primary purpose in setting up the Communications Branch Supply Base in Calcutta is to supply the various OSS detachments in CBI and BBDO with ample signals equipment and replacements thereof with the minimum of delay.

2. Calcutta was chosen as a base not only because it is the principal supply base for the U.S. Army in the Far East Theater but because it is a center of the transportation not to excluding OSS installations such as Rangoon, Bhamo, Chittagong and Ceylon and Trincomalee, Ceylon.

3. The object is to build up inventory to a point where a steady flow of signals equipment can be fed to the various detachments to fill current demands and at the same time, because of the time lag in shipments of material from the United States, build up adequate reserves of signal supplies which can be rushed to branch heads or to new bases which may be set up in accordance with future operations.

4. With this in mind, a large site on the outskirts of Calcutta was selected. The building is large enough to warehouse a fairly complete stock of communications equipment and yet permit space for further

to coordinate communications by radio and telephone through the officer.

For the Communications Branch:

JACK E. MURPHY  
Major Sig. C.



Inclosure 3.

copy

17 May 1944

Colonel Carl Kifler  
Office of Strategic Services

Dear Colonel Kifler:

No doubt you are aware of the fine photograph work accomplished by Warrant Officer Robert R. (Bob) Rhea on his assignment to "get pictures" of American troops in combat against the Japanese near Npnum, northern Burma, from 25 March to 15 April, 1944.

My purpose in writing to you is to inform you of the trying and nerve-racking circumstances under which these pictures were obtained. The actual combat took place in a pretty small area and was under constant bombardment by the Japs. On several occasions Bob, in his anxiety to get good pictures, found himself in precarious positions and was ordered to find safer places from which to shoot his action pictures.

On this assignment numerous photographers were to record the fighting techniques of American soldiers against the Japanese so that others who would follow could get visual knowledge of how battles are fought in the jungle.

Were it not for Bob Rhea this knowledge would never have been obtained because he alone of the photographers ventured into the zone where the fighting was thickest and the going the toughest.

In my opinion Warrant Officer "Bob" Rhea heaped mountains of credit not only on himself but on the "Knothead" group, Detachment 101 and OSS in general. He helped to create the now well known fact that when tough jungle jobs are to be done OSS men can and will do them.

If bravery and courage merit recognition it is my humble opinion that Warrant Officer Robert R. Rhea should be cited for his coverage of this assignment.

JAMES STUART



Enclosure 4.

COPY

FIELD PHOTOGRAPHIC BRANCH  
HQ. AND HQ. DETACHMENT  
OSS, ETOWNA.

4 April 1944

From: Lieut. (jg) H. M. Beggins, London Office.  
 To: Lieut. E. R. Kellogg, Washington Office.  
 Subject: Focusing of K.20 Camera.

1. In the early part of January, in a discussion with a group of photographic officers from the Army Pictorial Service (U.S. Signal Corps), Eighth Air Force, Ninth Air Force and U.S. Navy, the idea was brought up that if the K.20 Aerial Camera could be adapted so that it could be focused for close-ups, it would fill a definite need in this theatre for a still camera. Not only was there a shortage of Speed Graphics among the Services, but there was a definite need for a more rugged still camera for amphibious and combat operations. Another advantage was that there were quite a number of K.20's available. We were requested to see what we could do with it.

2. W/O Van Pelt and I took the camera apart and studied its construction and operation. We believed the job could be done, and called Mr. Frank Durban, engineer for Frank Brockline, Ltd., Simplicity representatives in the United Kingdom, to see if he could do the necessary machine work. The Army Pictorial Service was so interested in our solution that they supplied the camera and paid for the necessary work and material. Mr. Durban offered a number of suggestions as the work progressed.

3. After it was finished, Mr. Robert A. Troidl, the Fairchild Camera technical representative, took the camera and adjusted it completely. He was so enthused by the adaptation that he sent pictures and drawings to Fairchild Headquarters in the United States, with recommendations that the factory build kits so that the cameras could easily be changed in the field, merely by doing the necessary machining to the body.

4. The first camera is undergoing exhaustive tests in the field by members of the Army Pictorial Service. Mr. Durban is fixing a second camera for a Navy combat camera crew. We expect this second job to be better than the first one, as some slight changes were made because of experience with the first one.

5. The camera, as adapted, will focus sharply from seven feet to infinity. The only apparent change to the camera is a narrow milled ring around the hood. There are no protruding parts, and the weight increase is only a matter of ounces. If the focusing device should fail, the camera can be used for the job for which it was originally designed.

- 2 -

6. We are not including any drawings or pictures at this time for two reasons: 1. We would prefer some pictures of the second camera, as it will be an improvement over the first. 2. The Fairchild Camera Company may complete adaptations for this camera in the very near future.

7. This letter is written merely for your information in case Field Photographic Branch should need a camera of this type in the future. Also, we understand that OSB is particularly interested in things that have been done for the other Services.

8. All the Services - Army, Air Force and Navy - have shown a great deal of interest and have indicated that they intend having their K.20's changed as soon as possible.

ROBERT W. BRAGGINS, JR.  
Lieut. (jg) U.S.N.R.

copy

Enclosure 3.

(BASIC: Ltr Hq, USAF, CBI, Office of Strategic Services,  
APO 885, dtd 27 May 44, Subj: Proposed Research & Development  
Laboratories for OSS)

685 (27 May 44)

1st Ind

Code: JMWLS/JN

6

HEADQUARTERS, U. S. ARMY FORCES, CHINA BURMA INDIA, A.P.O. 885, 31 MAY 1944.

TO: Commanding General, Services of Supply, U.S.A.F., C.B.I., A.P.O. 885

1. The proposal of OSS to establish and operate research and development laboratories as outlined in basic communication is approved.

2. The Services of Supply will make every effort to supply and equip these laboratories in accordance with existing WD instructions for the supply of OSS in overseas theaters.

By command of Lt. General STILWELL:

EDWIN O. SPAN  
Lt. Col., AGS  
Asst. Adj. Gen.

Incls.  
n/c

c o p y

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES ARMY FORCES  
CHINA BURMA INDIA

## OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

27 May 1944

SUBJECT: Proposed Research & Development Laboratories  
for OSS

TO: Commanding General - Hq. USAF-CBI, APO 885

1. Following brief is presented for purpose of securing approval of project in order that requisitions might be drawn against field stores. In view of the urgency of the project, it is desired to take every step possible to avoid the time delay which would be entailed by securing material from the US.

2. It is proposed to establish three field laboratories to handle immediate problems arising in the field for OSS. One laboratory is to be located in Ceylon, another at Headquarters, Detachment 101, Assam, while a third is projected for China.

3. Functions to be performed by these laboratories are those which require immediate action and cannot be carried out, owing to the time factor, by laboratories located in the US. No long range projects will be undertaken in the field but only those which the design, production and field testing can be accomplished in short order.

4. Enumerated below are typical examples of what will be attempted in the field. (1) Design and production of equipment to accomplish certain special functions. These devices will not be limited to any certain field of endeavor or service branch, i.e. ordnance, engineers, etc., but may involve a combination of all branches. Illustration: Design of locator for parachuted bundles. The existing airborne locator is not usable by OSS. (2) Modification or use of standard service equipment, serving as a basis, for special equipment. Example: Design and production of firing mechanism for Rocket ammunition. (3) Camouflage of various material to make it appear innocuous to the enemy. This will not involve combat camouflage. (4) Packaging of equipment in broken lots as requirement arises to afford prolonged moisture and water as well as abrasive protection. Example: Weapons which might require underground or under water storage for long periods. Protection of demolition stores against moisture deterioration. (5) Maintaining constant surveillance on perishable stores and equipment to assure its proper functioning on operations. This applies to incendiaries, pyrotechnics, fuse, caps, instruments, etc. (6) Preparation of special demolition charges for target reduction.

- 2 -

5. Requisitions are attached covering emergency quantities of material which will be required from time to time. These quantities are kept at a low figure with the idea of these serving merely as stop gap in case common stores are unable to provide the equipment as desired. It is desired to have larger stocks of raw material made available by approval in order that requisitions might be drawn against approved quantities when needed. Attached requisitions cover estimated quantities for a three month period with the exception of machine tools and hand tools. These items should suffice for a one year period and only in case of expansion will additional tools be required.

6. The overall physical set-up of the laboratories will be kept to a minimum in order that establishment might be moved forward readily as operations dictate.

7. In cases involving semi-production quantities, it will be necessary to call either upon service shops or to let work out on contractual basis. Final assembly in all cases will be done at the laboratory.

Sam G. Lucy  
Major, AUS



COPY

HEADQUARTERS

OSS BU DETACHMENT 101

12 May 1944

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Colonel Carl Rafter

FROM: Major Lucy

1. Following is a requested brief of contemplated RAD field branch including: (a) Its objectives, (b) Physical set-up of laboratory, (c) Disposition of units, (d) Personnel requirements, (e) Estimate of time element.
2. Justification for field laboratories and staff might be summed up citing the need for an organization to develop and supply special devices, weapons, charges, etc., where time does not permit their being developed and produced in the States, to supply expert consulting service to operations people as well as to assist training men in use of newly developed equipment. It is not intended to undertake any long range research programs in the field. By and large, elaborating upon above, the functions of the laboratories will be to: 1. Modify standard service and OSS equipment to meet immediate operational requirements. 2. Prepare special demolition charges after studying targets. 3. Camouflage all types of equipment, radios, weapons, firing devices, clothing, etc. 4. Design and produce special mechanisms required on short notice including psychological deception devices. 5. Continuously check stores material to assure its proper functioning on operations. This phase is to include packaging of equipment and material for the purpose of protecting it against water and moisture. It might be stated that this function cannot be overstressed. The ultimate success of an operation depends entirely upon proper functioning of material and equipment.
3. Facilities for carrying out such a program at the start will consist essentially of the following tools and equipment. One each machine, bench lathe, wood turning lathe, shaper, grinder and drill press. In addition to machine tools an adequate supply of both metal and wood working hand tools is being secured. Small aluminum and brass casting furnaces will be installed. Chemical equipment will not be on an elaborate scale but will be adequate to perform activities in pyrotechnic field, moisture study, incendiary preparation and other functions that do not involve qualitative and quantitative analysis with the exception of moisture determination. For efficient operation of the lab. limited stores of service material and equipment as well as raw stock will be maintained in laboratory stores. It is intended to keep these stores



- 2 -

as small as is consistent with demands in order that it might be readily moved as developments require. It is most desirable, in the writer's opinion, to keep the unit at all times abreast with rear echelon headquarters at least. Looking into the future, considering possibilities of relatively large demand necessity might arise where a two echelon unit would be required. It is conceivable that eventually an extensive central plant will be feasible as well as necessary.

4. It is contemplated at present and wheels have been put into motion to establish two field laboratories in the FX. Disposition of operating units, transport, etc., does not make one central location workable for the time being. Working on this theory, a laboratory will be set up at 101 and another at 404. It is further contemplated that any Chinese considerations will be held in abeyance until the two above labs. are in operation and until Chinese requirements are determined. During the interim, Chinese requirements will be cared for out of 101. In all probability, the distances separating the 101 and 404 above will be appreciably reduced by future operations. When and if this becomes an actuality one central laboratory might be established. At any rate, the organization will be kept fluid in order that it might be readily moved, split up or converged as operational requirements dictate. It is conceivable that once converging it will again be necessary to split up.

5. Personnel requirements have been estimated on a very conservative basis. The lily has not been painted. It is the desire to bring section heads from the States. These men are to be qualified engineers in each of the phases of endeavor to be undertaken. In other words, each installation will require an explosive engineer, mechanical or electrical engineer, chemical engineer and a camouflage expert with one or two assistants. These men will at the outset design as well as construct all devices. Should the occasion arise requiring a large volume of any certain device, the various component parts will be turned out to commercial concerns and the final assembly made at the laboratory. Should volumes on the whole tend toward the large side either available GI mechanics or native personnel will be employed. It is almost essential that the various section heads be men familiar with what has been done in the States and who are familiar with Army equipment and material. These men need not necessarily be military personnel but preferably so in order that they be familiar with military equipment. These men should be sent out at the earliest possible date in order that design work be gotten under way and that they become familiar with requirements at an early date.

6. A time estimate of two months hence is made as the latest date these men should be in the theater.

COPY.

SECRET

FROM : Rear Headquarters, Supreme Allied Commander, South East Asia.

DATE : 8 June, 1944.

SHAG/s/LL/v/LL.

TO : O.S.S.

SUBJECT:

SPECIAL EQUIPMENT.

1. Reference visit of Colonel Riffier and Lt. Col. Berne to this Headquarters.
2. There is a request from S.O.G. for sufficient quantities of the equipment contained in Appendix "A" to carry out trials in this theatre.
3. Certain of the items contained in your publication "Underwater Operations" were demonstrated to Lt. Col. Hasler (S.O.G.) in London, and demands have been placed through C.O.H.Q., London, but none of it has been used by S.O.G. personnel in tropical conditions.
4. It would be appreciated if this Headquarters could be informed if this requirement can be met, and, after the trials have taken place and possible recommendations made, a detailed estimated demand will be placed through the appropriate channels.

Appendix "A" to "S" Division letter  
No. SBAO/J/11/1/51.  
Dated 8 June, 1944.

O.S.S. EQUIPMENT.

- |    |  |      |     |
|----|--|------|-----|
| A. | Lamberton Shallow water Breathing Apparatus, complete with modified face piece giving improved vision..... | sets | 10  |
| B. | Spare oxygen bottles for above.....  | sets | 20  |
| C. | Line canisters for the above.....  | sets | 200 |
| D. | Swim Fins, extra length, O.S.S. design:-   |      |     |
|    | Large size .....   | prs  | 5   |
|    | Medium large size.....   | prs  | 5   |
|    | Medium size.....   | prs  | 5   |
| E. | Latest type light rubber waterproof underwater suit swim.....  | sets | 10  |
| F. | 2-man Kayks, new pattern, complete.....  |      | 10  |
| G. | 8-man Kayks, with detachable outrigger for outboard motors, complete.....                                  |      | 5   |
| H. | Outboard motors for above, with scale of spares.....   |      | 4   |
| I. | 12-volt electric outboard motors, with scale of spares.....  |      | 4   |
| J. | 2-man inflatable surfboards.....   |      | 10  |

Also required, although not in O.S.S. catalogue :-

- |  |        |                     |                         |
|--|--------|---------------------|-------------------------|
| L.C.(R)                                  | 7-man  | Complete .....      | 2                       |
| L.C.(R)                                  | 10-man | Complete .....      | 2                       |
| Evinrude Light 4 muffled outboard engine |        |                     |                         |
|  |        | for the above ..... | 2 with scale of spares. |

**SECRET**

HEADQUARTERS  
2677TH HEADQUARTERS COMPANY OSS (PROVISIONAL)  
APO 512, U.S. ARMY

13732  
*Field Experimented General*  
*1 April -*  
*Special Top*  
*1 Downed*  
17 April 1944

Brig. General William J. Donovan  
Office of Strategic Services  
Washington, D. C.

Sir:

The following is a report of my activities since you assigned me to my present duties. As my understanding of this mission has been derived from talking to you and a number of other members of OSS, I believe it important that I enumerate a few of the ideas that have slowly taken shape. In enumerating these ideas, I shall first place my mission in the form of the problems facing me.

1. The time delay between the development of special O.S. equipment and the use of such equipment in the field is too great.
2. The study of special equipment developed by our Allies and the possible use of same by field units of the OSS.
3. The study of special problems facing Army commanders where OSS may contribute aid in solving same.
4. Such other assignments as you may from time to time assign me or my unit.
5. Turning over my unit in the Far East to Colonel Campbell.

In reference to the first problem, I visited all of the departments of OSS Washington dealing with special devices and requested samples of same. Of the samples submitted to me, I selected sufficient to fill two suitcases weighing 100 lbs. These samples were shown to members of SO-SDE London and members of 31 London, as well as a number of other Army and Navy personnel. Attached is a list of some of the personnel to whom these samples were shown. The difficulties of production in Washington without orders from the field was explained. However, the attitude of hopelessness felt by the operator in the field in ordering equipment which is not in production, when equipment that is available in Washington often takes months to reach him after he orders it, is well understood by me. I felt it useless to attempt to explain Washington's problems in securing priority for productions to operators, for until I interested myself in this problem, I was unable to understand it myself. I therefore attacked the problem from the viewpoint of the operator in more or less a conspiracy against Washington. I requested a problem which was facing them or the setup of a special problem which would request Washington's help. This problem would then be put up to Washington

**SECRET**

Form 4191

Date

To: Ned

I don't think Col. Bifler's letter requires a reply. It is a report, and investigation has been made into each phase mentioned by him. Furthermore, the new requirement committee helps to meet his problem. This, combined with his possible assignment to MacArthur, renders his points moot.



OSS Form 4001

## OSS SECRETARIAT - ROUTE SLIP

Date

To	Name	Initials
	O. C. Doering, Jr.	
	C. A. Hane	
	J. B. Donovan	
	D. C. Ice	
	G. S. Platt	
	P. F. Purkins	
	E. J. Putzell, Jr.	
	A. W. Sullivan	
	R. Thrun	
	Ellen	

(23695)

appropriate part,  
sent to Field Photo  
MU, Services  
Copies sent to SSO+  
Lonell



# SECRET

and a direct answer requested. The last one used for sale was a problem facing SO-SOE London in sinking a number of ships in a harbor in Europe. The problem is substantially as follows: In a harbor port in Europe are generally five or six ships at a time, which are mined operations wish sunk. It was decided by SO-SOE London to sink these ships, using limpets attached by underwater swimmers.

1. The first disadvantage was the weight of the limpets for the distance they must be carried by the swimmers.
2. The magnets on the limpets denied the swimmers the use of a compass.
  - a. The first disadvantage they decided to overcome by having the swimmers relay the limpets on one night to a spot close to the ships and leave them attached to a buoy or other marker. Then on the following night the swimmers would move the limpets from their temporary resting places to the sides of the vessels chosen as targets.
  - b. The swimmers once underwater would have to locate the targets the best they could.

When SO-SOE London was shown our pickup type limpet, they were satisfied that this type limpet would solve the problem facing them. But as they were first acquainted many months ago with this limpet, and as it had not been put into production to date, they considered it hopeless to order same, stating that they had requested a number of these limpets previously, and that no action had been taken on their order. From my standpoint this was an ideal case. There were the necessary ingredients needed by Washington for action, and a chance for Washington to come through. I felt that if Washington could deliver the answer to this problem, it would, to a great extent, renew the field operators confidence in Washington. The problem was put up to your office in a wire and an affirmative answer received requesting TCA for shipment. A copy of this wire and my answer was given to the SO officer interested and I dropped out of the case. However, I followed through on my own and found no further action being taken. I then went to the supply officer of SO and asked him if he had taken action, or was following through to see that this order was properly put through channels. He replied that though he knew of the transaction, the problem of securing TCA and ordering the limpets had not been given to him. I had dinner with the supply officer, and suggested that as we were all trying to get a job done, if I were he, I would swallow my pride and dignity or whatever it was and go to the SO officer and ask him for the order. My impression was that the SO officer involved did not know the necessary mechanics still needed, and believed that the action that I had taken was all that was necessary. The supply officer assured me that he would follow through and see that the necessary action was taken. From the above and other instances like this, I am of the opinion that half of the trouble is that the operators do not know the many and complicated channels that have been set up in OSS, and that the operators requisitions often get into the wrong channels and bog down. This results in a loss of confidence in Washington and a general attitude of hopelessness which I can assure you I well understand.

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• SECRET •

On the second phase of my mission, I visited all of the British plants development, research and initial production. I believe our research and development department superior to the British, that is as far as available personnel and preliminary experimental resources are concerned. However, their initial production is far superior to anything that we have. They have attacked the problem of initial production by producing initial and small orders in their own shops. This, in my opinion, is the only sensible solution to initial production. Had I depended upon Washington for equipment, my mission in the Far East would have failed. However, foreseeing this problem, I carried out to the jungles a small portable machine shop, and immediately made arrangements for use of local facilities and local production. In my opinion, Washington to date has not realized this problem and has failed to take action upon it. The British, therefore, have on this point far surpassed us. Two items developed by British research and development interested me particularly.

1. A sleeve gun with a silencer.
2. A four man submersible motor boat. It has a range of approximately 1200 miles on its Diesel engine, a speed of approximately six miles per hour on the surface, endurance of 18 hours underwater, with a speed of about two knots an hour on its electrical engine. I visited the base where this boat was being tested, rode in it and operated it myself on the surface; it is very simple. I took approximately 50 feet of motion pictures of the craft diving. In addition to carrying four men, it is constructed to carry 2,000 lbs. of supplies. These supplies can be released when the boat is underwater, with a small float going to the surface to indicate to the surface craft where the supplies are located. Though this boat is not the complete answer to the problem of introducing agents and supplies to enemy occupied territory, I believe that it has sufficient merit that we should construct some of this craft with the idea of further experimenting, training crews, and putting this type craft into operations. British SOE are faced with the problem of Admiralty approval before construction. I was told by the Colonel commanding the British research and development that he believed this boat could be produced commercially for about \$20,000 a piece. This boat is not a submarine, and should not be confused with one. It is a simple submersible motor boat, and a man could be trained to operate it in a matter of days. British SOE offered the plans of this boat to us if you are interested in production or future experimentation. I recommend that you back this boat; Major Coleman of our procurement division is now in London, and can secure the plans and follow them to the U.S. Major Coleman accompanied me on all my trips in inspecting British laboratories and work-shops and is thoroughly familiar with this boat.

In reference to procurement of supplies, the marine division have requested an order of the different devices that I showed them. This order has been put through proper channels and attached hereto is a copy of same as an additional check. It is requested that the equipment requested in this order be furnished at the earliest available time.

SECRET

● SECRET ●

Our photographic division has developed a new system of interpreting aerial photographs. I have shown the books printed on this subject to a number of people interested in aerial photography interpretations. The book has been well received, and it is suggested that the field photographic unit send additional copies to the theater officer in each theater for distribution to interested parties.

On the third phase of my mission, I have gone slowly. Should I attempt to barge in and offer aid, I should only fail. How to have Army commanders send for me is a problem. At present I am attempting to get my initial edge through personal contact other than official. Some success has been achieved in that the Chief of Staff of British Combined Operations, Brigadier V. P. Thomas, requested that I visit him. This visit resulted in the Chief of Engineers of Combined Operations, Colonel A. J. W. Dove, calling on me with a problem of simultaneously and pre-determined underwater explosion. Although none of our toys were suitable, I was able to suggest an answer, and tell him where he could get the necessary equipment. The visit with the Brigadier also resulted in an introduction to a friend of his on Admiral Mountbatten's staff, General William Lushington, and a request to show our equipment to him.

On the fourth phase of my assignment, according to your instructions, I took up the matter of entry into Country "X" with Colonel Bruce. He immediately foresaw a number of objections unless the Army or War Department gave me an assignment which would allow me entry not in violation of your agreement with the Ambassador. I could see no objection to such an arrangement and feel that as I do not intend to operate, but to look over the situation and formulate a plan, no danger of a political nature should be anticipated. Since then I talked to Joe Scribner in London and pointed out to him the error of the alternative plan that he suggested. I therefore feel that you were in error in not following out Colonel Bruce's suggestions, and suggest that arrangements be made for entry along the line he suggested in his wire. In the event of operations, I still feel that cover of the nature Colonel Bruce suggested is the best, as I would not operate unless sure of success.

On the fifth phase of my assignment, I cannot turn over my organization to Colonel Coughlin until the auditor has completed the audit. I do not feel that your best interests would be served by my returning immediately to India and setting about waiting. I am, therefore, keeping in touch with the situation and have been working on other phases of my assignment in such a way as not to waste any time which can be utilized in more productive ways.

Respectfully yours,

*Carl F. Eifler*  
CARL F. EIFLER  
Colonel, Inf.

SECRET

OSS Form 4001

## OSS SECRETARIAL - ONE SLIP

Date

TO	NAME	INITIALS
	O. C. Doering, Jr.	
	C. A. Bane	
	J. B. Donovan	
	D. C. Lee	
	G. H. Platt	
	P. F. Pugliese	
	E. J. Putzell, Jr.	P
	A. W. Sullivan	
	R. Thurn	
	Files	
	We are collecting these files for the [unclear] [unclear]	
	of [unclear]	

(29698)

SECRET

O. S. S. DETACHMENT  
Maritime Branch  
LONDON

10 April 1944

SUBJECT: Request for special OSS Equipment.

TO : Services.

1. It is requested that this Branch be furnished with the following OSS Items, which were demonstrated to the London offices by Colonel Wiffler.

6	Explosive candles (of each type)
25	Tommy guns with silencer
6	Fluorescent pencils
6	Flashlights for fluorescent equipment.
150	Rivet-type limpets, with cartridge
25	Photo-electric switches (for railroad tunnel attacks)
2	Pinpoint signaling sets (3 reflectors to each set)
25	Clockwork time detonators
25	Blast switches for "sympathetic" detonating, in sequence.
50	Sudden death tablets.
1 box	Photographic proof paper
100	"City Slicker", to light oil slick on water
60	Caccolubes (to insert in crankcases)
1 box	Ashless paper
100	Watertight, waterproof envelopes.
50	Flashlight batteries with message compartments.
50	Stingers; reloading, light type
25	Stingers; improved new type
12	Tear-gas guns
200	Energy tablets -- Benzadrine sulfate
6	Briefcases with two false compartments
2	Suitcases with false bottoms

For Lieut. Comdr. R. R. GUEST:

RICHARD M. WILBUR  
2nd Lt., AUS  
Supply Off., MU

SECRET



SECRET

ATTENDANCE OF MEETING IN COLONEL TELLER'S  
ROOM 4 April 1944

Rae Smith, MO Branch  
E. Black, AD/M Section SOE/SO  
R. W. Jennings, SO  
S. W. Embury, SO  
C. E. Miller, SO  
W. C. Jackson, SO  
E. Johnstone, EVP Section  
H. Nak, Major, ISRB  
M. Murphy, ISRB  
J. C. Adamson, Major ISRB  
H. M. Carver, ISRB  
H. Steiner, ISRB  
J. Jole, ISRB  
C. V. Russell, ISRB  
A. Blanner, ISRB  
R. Dobson, ISRB  
H. Hale, ISRB, Training  
A. H. Topping, ISRB  
F. E. Rosell, Jr., SO  
Kai Winkelhorn, Capt., SO, Denmark  
J. D. Coleman, Major, F Section  
J. W. Mann, SO/SOE D/B Section  
Gellerd, Capt., Denmark  
Lt. Comdr. Pollock, Norwegian

SECRET



DJR/vk

**CONFIDENTIAL****OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.****SECRETARIAT****1 MAY 5 AM 9 24****001**

2 May 1944.

**From:**  
**To:**Chief, Maritime Unit, Washington, D. C.  
Lt. (jg) E. J. Fittell, Jr., Room 124  
Administration Building.**Subject:**Submersible motor boat recommended by  
Colonel Riffler.

1. I have cabled Major Coleman in London requesting that he obtain the plans and specifications of the above mentioned submersible so that a further study might be made.

2. I have discussed this submersible with Captain Ward P. Davis, USN, and Commander H. G. A. Woolley, RN, and they are of the opinion that this is the Wellman-Freighter developed by the British SOE.

3. After we receive the plans and specifications, I suggest that the question of the use that this submersible can be put to by O.S.S. be thoroughly explored before production is recommended.

*Dennis J. Roberts*  
Dennis J. Roberts

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*Col. Bous*  
**SECRET****OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES****WASHINGTON, D. C.****10 April 1944****MEMORANDUM****FOR: The Assistant Director**

In connection with the attached memorandum from Lt. Putsell in which he referred to me an excerpt from Col. Eifler's letter to General Donovan, dated 17 April 1944, the following information is pertinent.

Since Mr. Lovell is primarily involved in the situation referred to by Col. Eifler, I asked him to give me his point of view and his memorandum of 28 April 1944 is attached. It seems reasonably clear that Col. Eifler sold something which he knew was still only in the development stage. However, the elapsed time between the time that Mr. Lovell's office received the request for pinup limpets and the time they were prepared and shipped indicates, in my opinion, that an excellent job was done by Research and Development and Procurement and Supply Branch.

The original cable from Col. Eifler asking for 15 pinup limpets came in on 31 March and a further request for an additional 36 came in on 8 April. In the meantime it had been pointed out to London that we could not possibly ship devices of this sort by plane without specific Theater Commander Approval. This approval was not received from London until 18 April.

Col. Eifler's memorandum included a copy of the request dated 10 April 1944 from London for certain special OSS equipment. A copy of Mr. Mayo's letter of 21 April 1944, showing the status of these items, is attached.

It seems clear to me that we can move fast at this end when we hear from the field as to just what they want. On the other hand, it is unfortunate that Col. Eifler assembled a group in London to discuss Special Items without having any member of the Services organization present so that they could be advised of what was under discussion. The list of those in attendance at Col. Eifler's meeting does not include any Services personnel.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

*C. M. Sears, Jr.*  
C. M. Sears, Jr.  
Lt. Colonel, AUS  
Chief, Services

**SECRET**

Attachments  
cc: Mr. Lovell  
Mr. Mayo

033 Form 9131

**SECRET**

On 4/25/44

to Lt. Colonel Sears Jr.

*CAL*  
The attached is an excerpt  
from a letter of General Eifler  
to General Donovan dated 17 April,  
1944, which is being forwarded  
for your information and appro-  
priate action.

*EJP*  
E. J. Putzell Jr.  
Lieutenant (J.G.), USNR  
Assistant Executive Officer

Attachment

Office of the Executive Officer

(30449)

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

In reference to the problem of time delay between the development of special OSS equipment and the use of such equipment in the field, I visited all of the departments of OSS Washington dealing with special devices and requested samples of same. Of the samples submitted to me, I selected sufficient to fill two suitcases weighing 100 pounds. These samples were shown to members of SO/SOE London and members of SI London, as well as a number of other Army and Navy personnel. Attached is a list of some of the personnel to whom these samples were shown. The difficulties of production in Washington without orders from the field was explained. However, the attitude of hopelessness felt by the operator in the field in ordering equipment which is not in production, when equipment that is available in Washington often takes months to reach him after he orders it, is well understood by me. I felt it useless to attempt to explain Washington's problems in securing priority for productions to operators, for until I interested myself in this problem, I was unable to understand it myself.

I therefore attacked the problem from the viewpoint of the operator. I requested a problem which was facing him or the setup of a special problem which would request Washington's help. This problem would then be put up to Washington and a direct answer requested.

The test case used for this was a problem facing SO/SOE London in sinking a number of ships in a harbor in Europe. The problem is substantially as follows: In a certain port of Europe are generally five or six ships at a time, which combined operations wish sunk. It was decided by SO/SOE London to sink these ships, using limpets attached by underwater swimmers.

1. The first disadvantage was the weight of the limpets for the distance they must be carried by the swimmers.
2. The magnets on the limpets denied the swimmers the use of the compass.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

- 2 -

1. The first disadvantage was the weight of the limpets for the distance they must be carried by the swimmers.

2. The magnets on the limpets denied the swimmers the use of a compass.

a. The first disadvantage they decided to overcome by having the swimmers relay the limpets on one night to a spot close to the ships and leave them attached to a buoy or other marker. Then on the following night the swimmers would move the limpets from their temporary resting places to the sides of the vessels chosen as the targets.

b. The swimmers once underwater would have to locate the targets the best they could.

When SO/SOE London was shown our pump type limpet they were satisfied that this type limpet would solve the problem facing them. But as they were first acquainted many months ago with this limpet, and as it had not been put into production to date, they considered it hopeless to order some, stating that they had requested a number of these limpets previously, and that no action had been taken on their order. From my standpoint this was an ideal case. Here were the necessary ingredients needed by Washington for priorities, and a chance for Washington to come through. I felt that if Washington could deliver the answer to this problem, it would, to a great extent, renew the field operators' confidence in Washington. The problem was put up to your office in a wire and an affirmative answer received requesting TCA for shipment. A copy of this wire and my answer was given to the SO officer interested, and I dropped out of the case. However, I followed through on my own and found no further action being taken.

I then went to the supply officer of SO and asked him if he had taken action, or was following through to see that this order was properly put through channels. He replied that though he knew of the transaction, the problem of securing TCA and ordering the limpets had not been given to him. I had dinner with the supply officer and suggested that

**SECRET**



**SECRET**

- 3 -

as we were all trying to get a job done, if I were he, I would swallow my pride and dignity or whatever it was and go to the SO officer and ask him for the order. My impression was that the SO officer involved did not know the necessary mechanics still needed and believed that the action that I had taken was all that was necessary. The supply officer assured me that he would follow through and see that the necessary action was taken. From the above and other instances like this, I am of the opinion that half of the trouble is that the operators do not know the many and complicated channels that have been set up in OSS, and that the operators' requisitions often get into the wrong channels and bog down. This results in a loss of confidence in Washington and a general attitude of hopelessness which I can assure you I well understand.

In reference to procurement of supplies, the marine division have requested an order of the different devices that I showed them. This order has been put through proper channels and attached hereto is a copy of same as an additional check. It is requested that the equipment requested in this order be furnished at the earliest available time.

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

OSS DETACHMENT  
Maritime Branch  
London

10 April 1944

SUBJECT: Request for special OSS Equipment

TO : Services

1. It is requested that this Branch be furnished with the following OSS Items, which were demonstrated to the London offices by Colonel Eiffler.

6	Explosive candles (of each type)
25	Tommy guns with silencer
6	Fluorescent pencils
6	Flashlights for fluorescent equipment
150	Rivet type limpets, with cartridge
25	Photo-electric switches (for railroad tunnel attacks)
2	Pinpoint signaling sets (3 reflectors to each set)
25	Clockwork time detonators
25	Blast switches for "sympathetic" detonation, in sequence
50	Sudden death tablets.
1 box	Photographic proof paper
100	"City Slicker" to light oil slick on water
60	Caccolubes (to insert in crankcases)
1 box	Ashless paper
100	Watertight, waterproof envelopes
50	Flashlight batteries with message compartments.
50	Stingers; reloading, light type
25	Stingers, improved new type
12	Tear Gas guns
200	Energy tablets -- Benzadrine sulfate
6	Briefcases with two false compartments
2	Suitcases with false bottoms

For Lieut. Comdr. R. R. GUEST:

RICHARD H. WILBUR  
2nd Lt., ACS  
Supply Off., MC

**SECRET**

**SECRET**

ATTENDANCE OF MEETING IN COLONEL WHITLER'S ROOM

4 April 1944

Rae Smith, MO Branch  
E. Black, AD/M Section SOF/GO  
R. E. Jennings, SO  
S. W. Embury, SO  
G. E. Miller, SO  
W. C. Jackson, SO  
E. Johnstone, EVP Section  
H. Nak, Major ISRB  
M. Murphy, ISRB  
J. C. Adamson, Major ISRB  
H. M. Carver, ISRB  
H. Steiner, ISRB  
J. Jole, ISRB  
C. V. Russell, ISRB  
A. Blanner, ISRB  
R. Dobson, ISRB  
H. Hale, ISRB, Training  
A. H. Topping, ISRB  
F. E. Rosell, Jr., SO  
Kai Winkelhorn, Capt., SO, Denmark  
J. D. Coleman, Major, F Section  
J. W. Mann, SO/SOE D/B Section  
Gellerd, Capt., Denmark  
Lt. Comdr. Pollock, Norwegian

**SECRET**

**OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.**

**SECRET**MEMORANDUM

**TO:** Lt. Colonel G. M. Sears

**FROM:** Stanley P. Levell

**SUBJECT:** Rifle Report, 17 April 1944

**DATE:** 20 April 1944

I have carefully read the attached report, and call your attention to certain corrections in matters of fact. The pin-up limpet, which is our new development to be attached to the side of a ship by an explosive rivet, was in an early stage of testing at the time of Colonel Eifler's departure. Until any Research and Development item has been successfully used under conditions duplicating or simulating reality, it is, of course, not finalized and therefore not turned over to procurement.

Regardless of the undeveloped stage of the pin-up limpet, as soon as Colonel Eifler's cable was received we dispatched two men to Hastings, Nebraska who succeeded in getting the 15 explosive charges of torpex especially cast and brought them back to Area F. Starting on them 4 April, the 15 limpets were ready for shipment to London on or about 13 April. By then we had received a cable for 36 additional limpets, and started to repeat the performance, which, of course, should have been done as one operation. Only on or about 20 April was Theater Commander approval received for air priority covering these items. The deadline having been set as 1 May for delivery to London, R&D wishes to report that for several days the entire 51 limpets have been completed and that the matter is merely one of transport.

I feel that this is as fast an operation involving production of a laboratory item as I have ever witnessed in my life, and I am certain that any attitude of frustration or hopelessness is merely failure to understand that when a foreign theater requires a weapon not in production (and, in this case, not having passed its final test) that we can get limited quantities to them by cutting red tape and turning handsprings, as we did in this instance.

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Lt. Col. C. M. Sears

-1-

28 April 1944

I am advised today by Captain Oppenheimer, Cargo Division, GDS, that all 51 limpets will be delivered to Major Granwell at our London office 1 May.



Stanley F. Lovell  
Director  
Research and Development

SPL:MAC

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**BY SEA POUCH**

21 April 1944

Colonel D. K. E. Bruce  
 3 Commanding General  
 European Theater  
 #1, APO 807

Attention: Lt. H.P.W. Christiansen

Dear Lt. Christiansen:

Your pouch letter dated 11 April setting forth requirements of the Maritime Unit in ETO has been received.

You will find listed below the status and availability of all items requested. A shipment covered by Cargo No. 30485 will go forth in about fifteen days.

- 6 ea - Explosive candles (of each type)  
 Although none are available immediately, we have requested that 3 of each type be manufactured and delivery is expected here in about two weeks.
- 25 ea - Tommy Guns with silencers  
 R & D are obtaining a quantity of M-3's in about two or two and one-half months, consequently this item is being cancelled at this time. Suggest that if required three months from now that the guns be requisitioned at that time.
- 6 ea - Fluorescent pencils
- 6 ea - Flashlights for fluorescent equipment  
 6 green pencils are included in Cargo No. 30485 as well as 6 filters and 6 flashlights. The filters fit any standard army flashlight.
- 25 ea - Photo-electric switches  
 London has been allocated 100 of these switches. Maritime's requirements should be furnished from this lot. None sent in this shipment.
- 2 sets - Pinpoint signalling sets  
 Washington Communication's Branch advises that Lt. Comdr. Orevson, in London, has ample stocks on hand. He should be contacted for these sets.
- 25 ea - Clockwork time detonators  
 The adaptors for use with the limpets are being procured at the moment and delivery is expected in time to include them on this cargo. The clockwork mechanisms are here and will be shipped with the adaptors.

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**50 ea - Sudden Death Tablets**

These are more commonly known as the "I" tablets and are procurable from the British in London upon presentation by you of the necessary justification. It is anticipated that a stock of these tablets will be maintained in Washington, however, the delivery time is unknown at present.

**1 box - Photographic Proof Paper**

One box consisting of 500 sheets will be included on this shipment.

**100 ea - "City Slicker"**

These items are not available at present from any source. The Navy is planning to manufacture these but no definite information is available. Suggest that if material be again requested in about 3 months if still required at that time.

**50 - Caccolubes**

These caccolubes are expected within a week and will be included in Cargo No. 30485.

**1 box - Ashless Paper**

One ream consisting of 500 sheets, size 8" x 10" will be forwarded on this cargo.

**100 ea - Watertight, waterproof envelopes**

These envelopes are available in three different sizes, and we are forwarding 35 of each size to you.

**50 ea - Flashlight batteries with message compartments**

200 of these batteries were forwarded to London recently, therefore, no action will be taken on this present request.

**50 ea - Stingers; reloading, light type****25 ea - Stingers; improved new type**

We do not plan to procure any of the new reloading, light type stinger unless a sudden new demand develops, however, we are forwarding 25 stingers of the regular type.

**12 ea - Tear-gas guns**

These are being shipped to you together with 110 cartridges. The caliber of the gun and cartridge, incidentally, is .38.

**200 ea - Energy tablets - Benzadrine sulfate**

Col. Missal, the OCS Medical Officer, has requested that no more benzadrine sulfate tablets be issued unless the recipient has been tested for reaction before leaving Washington, or else by a competent medical authority in the field. We are, therefore, not including any in this shipment.

**5 ea - Briefcases with two false bottoms****2 ea - Suitcases with false bottoms**

Major Hill is handling these items only and will make all the necessary arrangements to forward them directly to you and as a result they will go forward under another cargo number.

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Very truly yours,

W. M. Mayo, Chief  
Procurement and Supply Branch

DD:mas

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To: General Donovan

The attached is submitted for your signature if you approve. You will recall that you have already signed an order appointing Colonel Campbell as Commanding Officer of Detachment 101 as well as Chief, OSS, China.

No attempt has been made in this order to set forth the substantive functions of the Unit. This would seem to have been taken care of by Mr. Harbison's letter to the Theater Officers, with copies to those in OSS, Washington, who are concerned.

*CAB*  
*Write to him*  
*through to [unclear]*  
*for [unclear] H. [unclear]*

Office of the Secretariat

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(9139)

*John Edgar Hoover*  
*Director*  
*11/11*  
*11/11*  
 SPECIAL AGENT  
 IN CHARGE  
 FIELD EXPERIMENTAL UNIT  
 STRATEGIC SERVICES OPERATIONS

TO: DIRECTOR

SUBJECT: Commanding Officer, *Field Experimental Unit*

Colonel Carl P. Rife is hereby appointed  
 Commanding Officer, Field Experimental Unit.

This Unit shall engage in such activities  
 as may be directed by the Director, and shall be under  
 the Deputy Director - Strategic Services Operations  
 for administrative purposes.

*Richard*  
 William J. Donovan  
 Director

*Correctional Unit*  
*WFO Landmarking*  
*on map only*

*Alm*  
**SECRET****OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES  
WASHINGTON, D. C.***13920*  
*10 March 1944*  
*10 March 1944*  
*10 March 1944*  
**10 March 1944****MEMORANDUM**

**TO:** General William J. Donovan

**FROM:** J. M. Scribner

**SUBJECT:** Kifler Mission

Attached is the corrected memorandum outlining subject proposal, together with the corrected letter to each of the Strategic Services Officers in the field. I believe both of these copies are changed in conformity with the ideas expressed by you in your office yesterday.

The letters to the Strategic Services Officers, with the memorandum attached, have gone forward.

I have disseminated copies of the letters and memorandum to Colonel Buxton, Mr. Cheston, General Magruder and Mr. Lovell, and Colonel Richards.

I have prepared sufficient copies of the memorandum so that they may be presented at a meeting of those whom you feel desirable to gather together in order to explain this project, which is in accordance with the wish you expressed. If you will advise me when your meeting is to be held, I will bring sufficient copies with me.

*J. M. S.*  
J. M. Scribner  
Deputy Director, ISO

**Attachments**

cc. Colonel Buxton  
Mr. Cheston  
General Magruder  
Mr. Lovell  
Colonel Richards

**From the Files of the Director  
Please Return**

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8 March 1946

## MEMORANDUM

TO: Colonel David K. E. Bruce  
 Colonel Edward J. P. Glavin  
 Lt. Colonel John E. Toulmin  
 Lt. Colonel Richard P. Heppner  
 Lt. Colonel John G. Coughlin  
 Mr. Lanning MacFarland

FROM: J. K. Scribner

Attached you will find an interoffice memorandum which is self-explanatory. This paper has been officially approved by General Donovan and he has authorized its dispatch accompanied by this letter to you.

To give you a little more of the general thinking than is contained in the attached, the General feels it is highly desirable for several reasons to establish Colonel Rifier in the capacity described in the enclosed.

One is that he is convinced Washington has not taken all the necessary steps to acquaint our forces in the field with the uses of all the special toys and devices which are available to us, and further that the continued exposition of these gadgets plus continued training in their use by experienced, trained men will result in their utilization in the field to the good of all concerned. For instance, there has recently been developed by Research and Development a gadget known as "The Male". The potentialities of the use of this device are enormous but we are convinced that without the energy and knowledge which may be developed through personnel especially trained in the techniques of its use the result may not be satisfactory nor its use so widely spread. In all of this work, Colonel Rifier is cooperating closely with the Chief of the Research and Development Branch with respect to the usage of the various devices, and Colonel Rifier's undertaking is a general OSS mission.

Although his activities are directly supervised by the Deputy Director, SSO, this arrangement is established for purposes of administration, and it is not intended to mean that his functions and relationships are in any way confined to the various Branches within SSO.

Obviously, the arrangement contemplated in the attached memorandum will or will not work smoothly, dependent upon the relationship and degree of cooperation which is developed between you and

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Colonel Kifler. This the Director believes to be a problem in human relationships, and he prefers to establish the unit as is outlined in the attached, and requests of both you and Colonel Kifler complete cooperation with respect to each other.

As you will see from the attached, Colonel Kifler may be requested directly from Washington to undertake particular special operations. In the event he is, he will be advised by General Donovan's office directly, and owing to the nature of certain of the operations which may develop, it may be the General's wish that he proceed with their implementation completely on his own initiative. Obviously, these undertakings may not be engaged in without Theater Commander approval, but the manner in which this is to be obtained, the method of execution, and the security of the operations are left completely to Colonel Kifler's discretion as he may be instructed by the Director's Office at the time he is directed to undertake the mission. It is appreciated here that this arrangement raises a delicate problem in relationships, but General Donovan has requested me to advise you that he is completely conscious of this problem and that he expects it to be made to work by you and Colonel Kifler together.

It must certainly be the Director's intention to send Colonel Kifler into the Theater under a mandate which will result in his getting thoroughly into your hair, and Colonel Kifler realizes the delicacy of his position in this matter.

I am instructed by the Director to advise you that you are to communicate with his office or this office directly, in the event, after Colonel Kifler has arrived in your Theater and you have had an opportunity to discuss his mission together in principle with an open mind, there are reasons of fact which in your judgment will make his mission, as outlined, operationally impossible.

I will add that the Director considers Kifler's mission one of highest priority and importance, and that the possibility of difficulty is thoroughly realized here, but ICG has instructed me to advise you that the Kifler mission "must be made to work."

Attachment

J. M. Scribner  
Deputy Director, SSC

P. S. General Donovan has seen and approved this letter.

J.M.S.

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7 March 1944

**RIFLER MISSION**

Notes on the Above Subject  
Resulting from  
Meeting in this Office this Morning  
at which were present

Colonel Rifler  
Lt. Col. Wigelow  
Mr. Scribner

As a result of conversation between General Donovan, Colonel Dunbar, Colonel Rifler, and myself, held in General Donovan's office last week, Colonel Rifler is assuming command of a special mission which may be known as the "Rifler Unit." Colonel Rifler is to work directly under the command of General Donovan's office and/or the Deputy Director, SSO. His mission will involve:

- (1) The continued demonstration and training in the field in the use of all special OSS toys and devices by means of personnel selected by Colonel Rifler, especially trained in connection with the gadgets and assigned to respective Theaters.
- (2) The carrying out of special missions with which he may be directly charged as the special representative of the Director of OSS.
- (3) The direction of the Unit will stem directly from Washington to Colonel Rifler and from him to his men in the field. Neither he nor his personnel will be under the jurisdiction of the Strategic Services Officers in the Theaters to which they are assigned. It is not the intention to establish in any of the Theaters a permanent personnel staff. It may, however, be necessary for Colonel Rifler to leave one or more men in a Theater in order to carry out either of the objectives outlined in numbered paragraphs 1 or 2 above.
- (4) Colonel Rifler is instructed to maintain appropriate relationships with the Strategic Services Officers and Chiefs of OSS Missions and their personnel in the field.
- (5) In addition to the foregoing, General Donovan wishes Colonel Rifler to acquaint the various Army commanders with the special OSS toys and devices and make the same available to them in the event they wish to be supplied. Obviously, the amounts to be supplied and other details will have to be worked out at the time.

In general, the plan for the implementation of the foregoing is as follows:

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a. Colonel Kifler will procure and transfer to Washington personnel presently estimated to be approximately 12 for special schooling in the techniques necessary to carry out their function. This personnel will be charged against SO T/O. The slots needed to take care of Colonel Kifler's personnel not now within OSS will be made available to SO from the special reserve pool available in the Director's Office.

b. Colonel Kifler will leave for London at as early a date as is possible to acquaint KFO with his mission as above described. From there he will proceed to GBI to complete the arrangements necessary for the turning over of his former organization to his successor, Colonel Coughlin. He will then return to London, possibly by way of Cairo and Algiers for purposes of acquainting the Strategic Services Officers there with respect to his mission.

Colonel Kifler contemplates that Lt. Colonel Richmond of the Burma Army and Captain Gurl, now in 101, will return to England with him and will be attached to his Unit, which action has been approved by General Donovan.

Colonel Kifler will spend most of his time in the field, moving from Theater to Theater, personally implementing the foregoing.

It has been proposed by Mr. Stanley Lovell that there be attached to Colonel Kifler's Unit specially trained scientific personnel, acquainted with the field of electronics. This subject was discussed by Messrs. Lovell and Scribner and Mr. Chadburn of OERD at a meeting in Mr. Scribner's office 6 March. These individuals will be supplied by OERD in uniform, not chargeable against OSS T/O, but on loan from OERD.

Colonel Kifler, prior to his departure, will arrange, in conjunction with Captain Allison, Mr. Lovell and Colonel Robinson, for the training program to be given to his men during his absence and for their housing and general schooling facilities. Captain Allison will follow through for Colonel Kifler in this matter during his absence.

The servicing of the "Kifler Unit" and the administrative responsibility in Washington shall be carried out by personnel approved by Colonel Kifler, established in Washington, working directly under the office of the Deputy Director, SSO. (It is presently contemplated that Captain Prasec will undertake this function.)

The movement of Colonel Kifler's personnel between Theaters is specially exempted from the provisions of General Order No. 14, Supplement No. 2, which requires permission from Washington for the movement of personnel between Theaters.

The Director has granted permission to Colonel Kifler to move his personnel between Theaters at will.

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
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An appropriate memorandum will be sent from the Director's Office to Special Funds appropriating \$100,000 for purposes of this mission.

Communication between Colonel Rifler and his personnel, either by cable or pouch, shall not be subject to inspection by the Theater Officer as provided in General Order No. 9, Supplement No. 31.

The Director has granted to Colonel Rifler the right to communicate between Washington and the field by means other than through the Theater Officers.

J. M. Scribner  
Deputy Director. 330.



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